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Current developmental research with children is based on false 
dichotomies between the child and society and between mind and 
society. Likewise there is little development in developmental 
psychology, but a view of static changes. This study seeks to trace the 
historical context in which this psychological research takes place in 
order to obtain critical insight into the problem. The logical positivist 
traditions and influences on methodology are found to be inadequate 
when dealing with development as a dynamic, changing reality and 
with individuals who are socially constituted beings. Scientific realism 
is seen to be able to overcome these dichotomies with an abductive 
account of method. Chapter 1 traces the influence of the logical 
positivist movement. Its laboratory experimental approach is seen as 
deficient in handling changing contexts. In chapter 2 the focus turns to 
the current view of childhood and development which is still influenced 
by the atomistic and static approaches of the logical positivist tradition. 
Theory of mind research is seen as a prototype of current research; 
with its focus on competencies that manifest at ever earlier ages. The 
focus is on the performance as an event and not the generating 
mechanisms causing the change. Vygotsky's dialectic orientation offers 
a view of the mind in society, which investigates the child through its 
context of interpersonal relatedness. This interrelatedness cannot be 
accommodated by current methods that continue to retreat to a 
hypothetico-deductive framework. Chapter 3 offers a developmental 
perspective by exploring different methodologies that might 
accommodate different ages. The abductive approach to scientific 
method within a scientific realist framework, is suggested as 
accommodating a truly developmental perspective. This approach 
suggests a change in attitude to methodology with a focus on generating 
theory based on problems. It also encourages a more collaborative 
approach to research which would take longer, as seen with the 
microgenetic method, but produce better quality results. 
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" ....... as human beings, we must inevitably see the universe from a 
centre lying within ourselves and speak about it in terms of a human 
language shaped by the exigencies of human intercourse. Any attempt 
rigorously to eliminate our human perspective from our picture of the 




The theoretical worldview on which most current empirical research 
is based, is an inherited set of conceptual categories that continues to 
have a logical positivist orientation (Hooker, 197 5 ). This has 
determined the prevailing view on the nature of science, which in 
turn has undergirded most research done in most scientific fields. Its 
view of epistemology portrays science as concerned with the validity 
of knowledge - a task which has traditionally been seen as 
problematic and in need of justification, proof, or validation. The 
primary aim of logical positivist science, then, has been of justification 
in the form of verification. While much of the philosophy attached to 
this tradition has been abandoned, its presence is still to be seen in 
the methodological assumptions that undergird most scientific 
research. 
The logical positivist view of theory plays an organizational role in the 
formation of knowledge as opposed to a generative role. This has 
prevented many from recognising the important role that theoretical 
research can play in challenging the prevailing logical positivist 
paradigm and offering alternative theories of knowledge and science. 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate how current methodologies used 
with children in developmental psychology maintain an adherence to 
logical positivist traditions. While many researchers will claim to have 
broken with the tradition, their use of methods belie such claims. 
Many researchers seem to find scientific realism an attractive view of 
science, yet little corresponding change is made to their 
methodologies. With this in mind, it seems useful to locate the 
historical background of current scientific research as well as the 
context in which the researcher resides. The context in which the 
research is itself done is dependent on these aforementioned factors. 
According to Hooker (1987) any account of science must involve the 
evolution of the biological, institutional and cultural context within 
which the scientific enterprise has been conceived and 
operationalized. Most psychological research has ignored this broader 
focus as it continues to be based on a paradigm which seeks to reduce 
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things to atomistic facts, and fails to acknowledge the socio-cultural 
context of its subjects and objects, of its researchers and researched. 
Rationality is held up as the triumph of humanity, with our ability to 
reason through events and act logically, to plan for the future and to 
create technology and science. Rationality is however just one ability 
in a cluster of human abilities, which traditional research has ignored. 
Our minds evolved on the same adaptive basis as the rest of biological 
evolution, using the processes of random generation and selection of 
what is generated (Ornstein, 1991). Humans have a multitude of 
interconnecting competencies. Science has sought to tap only a few of 
these, primarily behaviour and now cognition; the others are ignored 
as are their effects on behaviour and cognition. The present scientific 
context has developed from a philosophy of science which has had a 
strong logical positivist emphasis and a resulting lack of global 
perspective. It has sought to impose its worldview of verification and 
subsequent reductionist methodology on all species, regardless of 
their status on the evolutionary ladder and regardless of the 
appropriateness of this perspective across different cultures. 
In order to understand something, it is helpful to trace how it came 
about or evolved. Therefore in Chapter 1 the present context is traced 
back to earlier times in order to place the approaches and dilemmas 
facing psychology today in perspective. The approaches of two of the 
most famous developmental psychologists of the century, Lev 
Vygotsky and Jean Piaget are worth considering. Vygotsky is widely 
acclaimed for introducing the historical approach to the development 
of higher psychological processes. He saw the need to search for 
specifically human behaviour in history and not biology, believing 
that the object of psychological explanation is regulated by historical 
rather than biological processes. Thus for Vygotsky the search for 
laws of development had to be conducted on the sociocultural level of 
reality and an appropriate methodology had to be devised (Wertsch, 
1985). On the other hand, Piaget believed that biological maturation 
explained the emergence of higher forms of behaviour. Although they 
had different views about development, both Piaget and Vygotsky 
expressed concerns about psychology near the turn of the century. 
Vygotsky ( 1982a) described psychology as being in crisis because 
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there was no overarching theoretical framework available for an 
integrated internally consistent explanation of human psychology. 
Empirical findings, hypotheses and theories were not interrelated and 
often seemed contradictory. It would appear that concerns of both 
psychologists are as relevant today as they were then. The separation 
of science from philosophy, facts from values and the subsequent 
dominance of positivist scientific knowledge this century, are factors 
that need to be addressed if one is to properly understand current 
psychological research. 
The positivist notion of having unity of method with the natural 
sciences has traditionally forced the social sciences to adopt a 
methodology that is appropriate with the subject of the natural 
sciences, but inappropriate for the subject of the social sciences. The 
context in which empiricist methodology takes place, the laboratory 
experiment, is not just a methodology, but also carries the additional 
force of a substantive theory. Its appropriateness in investigating the 
social sciences has been attacked by those who would see a complete 
separation between the natural and social sciences. The hermeneutic 
tradition has arisen in response to the failure of the natural science 
approach to accommodate the subject of the social sciences. Its focus 
is on the meaning and activity of the intentional agents who are held 
to be the true subject matter of the social sciences. It denies that 
research with animals has anything to do with research on humans. 
This lack of a unitary framework is not new and has plagued 
psychology's progress for most of its history. Dissatisfaction with the 
positivist tradition in psychology has led some to propose the 
separation of psychology into many sciences, while others prefer to 
take psychology right out of the scientific domain. Some would see 
psychology as being outside of science and belonging more to the arts. 
This all turns on what one's view of science is. 
The scientific realist notion of science seems to offer a framework 
within which the natural and social sciences can co-exist, without 
compromise on the part of the social sciences. Bhaskar's (1975) anti-
positivist naturalism and Hooker's evolutionary naturalist realism 
appear to accommodate the hermeneutic ideals of science that are 
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sited in historical, social and ecological activity as well as offering the 
concept of a critical theory of science. According to Hooker ( 19 8 7) the 
scientific realist global theory aims to explain how humans behave 
and how they come to know what they do about what they do. There 
is no class of accepted truths that can serve as the foundation for this 
endeavour; instead reality is known only through our attempts at 
theoretical description. Vollmer ( 19 8 8) suggests that it is not the goal 
of epistemology to give absolute justifications for claims to knowledge 
or truth. While one might wish to have perfect knowledge, such 
wishes are fulfilled only in the unrealistic foundations of 
foundationalist epistemology. Thus for Vollmer we have a 
straightforward choice between perfect knowledge about nothing or 
imperfect knowledge about the real world. The real task of 
epistemology is the explication of our concepts of knowledge and the 
analysis of such a commitment to such conceptions. Furthermore, 
epistemology has the task of distinguishing between subjective and 
objective structures, between descriptive and normative concepts and 
between constitutive and regulative ideas. The methodological 
conditions for successful inquiry need to be elucidated as well as the 
specification of the limits to our knowledge. This view of epistemology 
accommodates a view of science different from logical positivism. 
Much research is done without cognisance of a realistic worldview or 
epistemology; such is the stranglehold of logical positivism. 
This study begins in Chapter 1 by tracing the historical context in 
which present day scientific research is situated. The logical positivist 
influences on 20th century science are seen to be maintained in the 
laboratory experiment paradigm. This commitment to positivist 
experimentation has determined much of the research carried out in 
psychology. Constructs that cannot be investigated using this 
methodology have been ignored or relegated to non-scientific status. 
It is argued that much of what constitutes human interactions cannot 
be investigated through use of this methodology. This paradigm fails 
to acknowledge the social nature of its subject matter as well as the 
dynamic nature of the reality in which the subjects reside. All this is 
passed over for variables that can be measured and controlled. A 
science that cannot accommodate its subject matter because of a 
restrictive methodology is in need of critical reappraisal. It is argued 
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that a scientific realist account of science provides a perspective 
which will accommodate methodologies that are suited to study 
historically situated individuals who reside in a changing world. 
With an appropriate scientific framework recommended, Chapter 2 
explores the current psychological understanding of childhood and 
development. Once again the logical positivist influence is seen with 
the view of the child as an isolated, independent entity; little 
recognition is given to the socio-historical context in which the child 
resides, context is treated as a variable which must be controlled. 
Thus the orthodox view of childhood seems to be determined by what 
the child can bring to the laboratory. 
Vygotsky and Piaget's views on development are traced and seem to 
indicate more of a genuine developmental focus than does current 
research. Current research seems to focus on development in terms of 
static changes, and is unable to contend with the notion of change 
itself other than as an event. The current practice of demonstrating 
how children acquire competencies at earlier ages than was 
previously thought possible is revealed in theory of mind research. 
This is used as a prototype of current research trends, with its 
emphasis on finding whether a child has a theory of mind at two, two 
and a half, three, three and a half or four years of age. There has been 
a flurry of activity in devising specific 'false belief' tests which aim to 
test whether the child is able to understand misrepresentations. From 
this claims are made as to whether the child has a theory of mind and 
whether that theory is representational or not. The focus of the tests 
has been to establish the age at which this understanding seems to 
occur. It would seem that precisely the criticism that was ill-advisedly 
levelled at Piaget for using age as a criterion could be made against 
theory of mind investigations. The validity of such tests in real life 
situations appears not to be of concern to the researchers. Nor does 
the fact that there is a good deal of uncertainty in science as to 
precisely what a theory is. Theory of mind research appears to be 
research that is done within a paradigm that is held somewhat 
uncritically. Hobson (1991) argues that children acquire knowledge 
about the world through the experience of affectively charged 
interpersonal relations. This is a Vygotskian notion, where 
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psychological functions occur first on the interpersonal plane. The 
focus of research needs to bear this in mind when it attempts to 
assess children's understanding of concepts. The motivation of 
assessments with children is suggested by Meacham ( 1991) as arising 
from a desire to intervene. This is seen as the domination of nature 
against which Meacham warns. 
Chapter 3 investigates alternative methodologies which can be 
appropriately used with different age groups. From this a 
developmental attitude towards method is suggested, where 
customary methods have not differentiated between age groups. 
Grounded theory, the methodology of Glaser and Strauss, is ·explored 
as an alternative to hypothetico-deductive methods. Haig's (1995) 
related abductive theory of scientific method is seen as a recasting of 
grounded theory, operating within a scientific realist framework of 
science. Here the focus is on theory generation and discovery as 
opposed to verification and empirical testing, offering a far broader 
range of research possibilities. The microgenetic method is used as an 
illustration of a truly developmental method, which employs different 
strategies to focus on the change that occurs in development. 
Narrative writing and assisted autiobiographical methods are seen to 
cater for individuals who have a wider linguistic repertoire than 
children. None of these are meant to be exclusive methods, but are 
intended to complement each other when appropriate. A scientific 




The Scientific Context 
With Hooker's recommendation that any account of science must 
involve the evolution of the broader context within which the 
scientific enterprise has been conceived and operationalized in mind, I 
intend to place psychology in its present day context by tracing the 
historical development of the philosophical basis of the various social 
sciences, including psychology. The ancient Greeks' concept of 
knowledge and its relation to philosophy and the philosophy of 
science that emerged is relevant in this regard. The final divorce of 
philosophy from science at the end of the nineteenth century, 
coincided with Comte's characterization of the positive state of 
knowledge. This positivist notion of knowledge has resulted in a ci 
philosophy of science which denies the possibility of any a priori 
knowledge and restricts knowledge to what is in experience. A 
methodology of experiment has emerged which is based on a 
mechanistic model of man, a Humean conception of cause and a 
methodology based on logical positivism (Harre and Secord, 1972). 
The laboratory experiment is the site of preferred knowledge, where 
individual variables are manipulated and dependent variables 
assessed. The results that are obtained are then inappropriately 
generalized back to the original context out of which the subject was 
taken. 
This has led to the naturalist/anti-naturalist debate which is reflected 
in the fragmented approaches of current psychology. Anti-naturalists 
contend that social behaviour cannot be treated as responses caused 
by stimuli and must be seen as actions of agents which are mediated 
by meanings; thus there are many critics who feel that the naturalist 
tradition in science is an unsuitable context in which to conduct any of 
the social sciences. The remedy, as suggested by the hermeneutic 
approach is to separate the two. This was seen with the separation of 
science from philosophy and mind from matter in behaviourism. 
Many in the hermeneutic tradition favour a theory of activity or 
events in which the agent's meaning is paramount. Proponents of this 
ideal have taken up some of Lev Vygotsky' s ideas about activity 
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theory, however they seem to have misinterpreted his position to 
mean a setting in which events or acts unfold. His intention was 
rather to present activity theory as a revolutionary critical activity in 
which meaning-making could occur. 
The realist tradition appears to be able to offer a theory which can 
integrate the different approaches into a critical account of science. 
Bhaskar's (1979) anti-positivist naturalist realism is an account which 
offers a unified scientific view on the natural and social sciences, yet 
allows for significant differences between them based on the 
differences in subject matter. Hooker's ( 19 8 7) evolutionary 
naturalism which is based on the realist view of science, similarly 
offers a unified view of humans and their world, yet honours the 
differences that make humans distinct. The realist view of science 
seems to be able to offer the synthesis that in the past has defeated 
scientists in their mind versus matter debate. The methodology of 
this realist approach seems to still be its infancy, with many in 
psychology reverting back to a reductionist individualism. This then, 
is the intellectual environment in which psychological research is 
currently taking place. It will be illuminating to see where theory of 
mind research locates itself, in this regard. 
1. 1. EARLIER NOTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE 
The constructive aim in perusing the history or development of 
something is to be able to offer better insight and critical awareness 
into the present state of affairs. Habermas'(1971) exposition of the 
relationship between philosophy, science and knowledge is worth 
considering as a historical account of the state of current scientific 
practice. He traces the early relationship of theory, or theoria, to the 
cosmos. In philosophical language, theoria was transferred to the 
contemplation of the cosmos. When one talks about pure theory one 
invokes knowledge of an apparently objective world of facts that has 
a transcendental basis in a prescientific world. This early conception 
saw knowledge as having a transcendental and objective basis in 
philosophy. The connection between theoria and the cosmos was, 
however, abandoned and the theory of knowledge has been replaced 
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by a philosophy of science. Transcendental knowledge or metaphysics 
was abandoned to philosophy; it was not seen as an empirical science. 
In 187 5 Comte characterized the positive state of knowledge as 
follows: 
In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the 
vain search for Absolute notions .... and the causes of 
phenomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws, that is, 
their invariable relations of succession and resemblance. 
Reasoning and observation, duly combined, are the means of 
this knowledge. What is now understood when we speak of an 
explanation of facts is simply the establishment of a connection 
between single phenomena and some general facts, the number 
of which continually diminishes with the progress of science, 
(vol. 1, p. 2). 
According to Manicas (1987) Comte saw scientific knowledge as a 
hierarchy starting with social physics, physiology, chemistry, physics 
and finally astronomy. He had no place for philosophy or psychology 
in his hierarchy, as they were metaphysical. 
In 1890 Hegel accepted the distinction between philosophy and 
empirical science, but defended philosophy as a legitimate inquiry in 
the pursuit of knowledge. The final divorce between philosophy and 
science occurred around the end of the nineteenth century. According 
to Habermas (1971) a philosophy of science emerged in which science 
was no longer one form of possible knowledge, but rather the sole 
farm of knowledge. Inquiry into the conditions of possible knowledge 
was meaningfully carried out only in the form of methodological 
inquiry into the rules for the construction and corroboration of 
scientific theories. This was the context in which doctrines were 
worked out. Positivism, the dominant view of science, used elements 
of empiricism to strengthen science's belief in its exclusive validity of 
the observational fact, instead of reflecting on it and accounting for 
the structure of the sciences based on this belief. Metaphysical 
questions were not seen as a part of science, but were the domain of 
philosophy, which no longer had a claim to knowledge. Thus 
philosophy has no role outside of critique, and by replacing the theory 
of knowledge with a philosophy of science, positivism protects 
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scientific inquiry from epistemological self reflection. The meaning of 
knowledge is defined by what the sciences do and can be explicated 
through the methodological analysis of scientific procedures. This 
restrictive view of knowledge from a positivist science has been the 
dominant context in which most scientific research has taken place 
this century. 
According to McCarthy ( 1984) positivism has subsequently 
disintegrated as a distinct philosophical movement and it is difficult to 
specify a common positivist perspective from Comte, Spencer and 
Haeckel's evolutionary positivism to the phenomenalism of Mach and 
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Avenarius and the logical positivi$_!11J- of the Vienna circle. It has 
however, been absorbed into the traditions of empiricism, pragmatism 
and linguistic analysis. Its problems and techniques, concepts and 
theories all pervade contemporary thought. Theories must make 
assertions at the observation level, according to the positivist 
empiricist analysis of science. Positivism adopts the rule of empiricist 
schools that all knowledge has to prove itself through the certainty, or 
near certainty, of systematic observation. The exactitude of this 
knowledge is guaranteed only by the formation of theories that allow 
the deduction of lawlike hypotheses. Any epistemology that 
transcends this framework of methodology will succumb to the same 
sentence of extravagance and meaninglessness that positivism once 
passed on metaphysics. 
According to Manicas (1987) psychology was launched as an 
autonomous science by Wundt in 1873. Wundt's physiological 
psychology gradually shifted towards experimental psychology 
between this time and 1911. Zuriff (1985) describes behaviourism as 
a psychological version of positivism, as both have attempted to 
isolate metaphysical questions by directing their focus towards 
positive knowledge. Thagard (1992) describes the replacement of 
introspectionism with behaviourism as occurring for methodological 
reasons. The call to study objective behaviour rather than subjective 
experience made psychology sound more scientific, recalling the 
dominant scientific ethos of the time. Likewise the task of social 
psychology has been to develop theoretical laws governing human 
behaviour. These laws are developed on the basis of systematic 
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observation and derivations are tested through subsequent 
experimentation. Observation and testing proceed on rigorous 
grounds, ruling out any potentially biasing factors and insist on 
replication by anyone doubting their validity. In this way science can 
) 
provide a repository of funadamental, empirically validated ( 
knowledge (Gergen, 1979). 
1.2. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 
According to Harre and Secord ( 1972), and as noted above, three 
fundamental ideas of positivism have been taken for granted in 
providing a sound methodological and theoretical foundation for a 
context in which behavioural science occurs: a mechanistic model of 
man, a Humean conception of causality and a methodology based on 
logical positivism. The more that psychology has honoured these 
conceptions, the more scientific it has claimed itself to be. The 
laboratory experiment is placed at the centre in psychology's search 
for knowledge and has determined much of the research carried out 
in psychology. This has led to an emphasis in research with animals, 
not humans, and a restriction of research to kinds of experiments 
where phenomena are analyzed into dependent and independent 
variables. This experimentation consists of manipulating independent 
variables and observing and correlating the subsequent changes in 
the dependent variables. 
1.2.1. The Mechanistic Model of Man 
Psychologists viewed people as objects who were passively affected 
by events in their environment. Their behaviour could be explained 
by a combination of effects of external stimuli and prevailing 
organismic states. This led to the view that people would respond to 
the push and pull of forces exerted by the experimenter or the 
experiment, like an animal. The contribution of factors internal to the 
organism were minimized as much as possible, hence the possibility of 
the subject being an active agent was excluded. Finally there was the 
belief that wherever a cause of the same type existed, the effect 
would be the same; thus the possibility of any contextual influence 
was completely ignored. This mechanistic model of man was seen to 
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be the only one that would satisfy the requirements for psychology to 
be regarded as a positive science. 
1.2.2. The Humean Conception of Cause 
The most scientific conception of cause was one which focussed on 
external stimulation and excluded from consideration any mode of 
connection between cause and effect. Causal laws were understood to 
express constant correlations of stimuli and responses; this excluded 
from empirical science any connection between cause and effect. This 
follows the approach of Hume's regularity theory, where there is a 
regular sequence of one kind of event which is usually followed by 
another of the kind (Harre and Madden, 197 5). Radical behaviourism 
gave external stimuli the status approaching that of efficient causes 
and organismic forces were regarded as conditions that were 
subservient to the primary impact of the external stimulus; thus any 
spontaneity or agency was discounted. This view of causation is 
associated with a deterministic and mechanistic view of human 
responses. 
1.2.3. Logical Positivist Methodology 
A methodology based on these principles was viewed as the best 
possible approach to a behavioural science. It required a 
verificationist theory of meaning and an operationist theory of 
definition; these were the legacies of the 1920 logical positivists of the 
Vienna Circle. The meaning of terms was given by the way statements 
in which they occurred could be verified. This resulted in an atomism 
of propositions where propositions were reduced to their elementary 
constituents. Basic facts were taken as 'atoms of experience' from 
which complex propositions could be constructed by using elementary 
formal logic. The role of theory was restricted to providing a 
framework for the organization of given facts. 
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1.2.4. Laboratory Experimentation 
The aforementioned assumptions imply a methodology that is 
restricted to simple manipulations of independent variables, which 
themselves are allegedly causes of behaviour. The assumption is that 
complex behaviour is merely an additive function of simple 
behaviours. This would explain the primacy that experimenters gave 
to experiments with animals; procedures were simpler and more 
manageable and produced more knowledge of the basic elements of 
which it was assumed behaviour was composed. It is here that 
operations can be performed that verify the causal link between 
antecedent and consequent events. 
Harre and Secord ( 19 7 2) claim that the experimenter treats the 
experimental paradigm as if its operations represent the concepts 
themselves. Empiricism is overemphasized at the expense of 
conceptualization. It is as if experimenters believe that observation 
and experiment by themselves can create a science. This is an offshoot 
from the logical positivist view that theory is an instrument has a 
merely organizational role. Psychologists still believe that the way to 
clarify concepts is to invent experimental operations and do 
experiments. They overlook the fact that they still have to be linked 
up with the social situation outside the laboratory. Experience, 
however, is not the passive reception of sensory inputs. Nor is thought 
a thing that happens to humans; it is something that humans do. 
By contrast Vygotsky's view on the state of research in the 1920s and 
30s expressed his suggestion that psychology incorporate a wider 
perspective on knowledge," Fact and philosophy are directly 
interrelated .. .If we want to find the key to this rich collection of new 
facts, we must first clarify the philosophy of the fact, the philosophy 
of its acquisition and interpretation. Otherwise, the facts will remain 
silent and dead," (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 55 in Newman and Holzman, 
1993). However, this was ignored as behaviourism began its rise to 
ascendancy. Habermas ( 1971) believes that replacing epistemology 
with a philosophy of science has led to an epistemology that is largely 
restricted to methodology. Subjects have lost their significance as 
inquiry into the knowing subject has been renounced; subjects of 
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knowledge have been reduced to nonsocial entities. The meaning 
dimension of knowledge for the knower itself has become irrelevant 
in the pursuit of rigorous knowledge and has been replaced with the 
meaning of facts, whose connection is described by theoretical 
propositions. Habermas believes that the fundamental connection 
between knowledge and interest will only be found when objectivism 
is dissolved in methodology. It is the task of a critical philosophy of 
science that escapes the snare of positivism, to demonstrate different 
categories of possible knowledge. Traditionally, the glory of the 
sciences has been seen to result from the unswerving application of 
their methods without regard for their knowledge-constitutive 
interests. Such a view, however lacks a means of dealing with the 
problems that appear once the connection of knowledge and human 
interest has been comprehended. 
Gergen ( 1985) cites the positivist influence of building scientific 
theory according to the cult of the fact. This is in line with early 
positivist theory which held that factual observation had to precede 
the construction of theory. This induction from fact to theory is seen 
to involve a move from the particular to the general. Thus what 
psychologists choose to call facts already presume a theoretical 
attitude. He claims that knowledge of the world is not a product of 
induction and hypothesis testing; nor is the process of understanding 
the world a result of the forces of nature, but a result of an active, 
cooperative enterprise of persons in relationships. Consideration has 
to be given to alternative theories of knowledge and criteria for 
assessing theoretical claims. The deployment of empirical data to 
justify and evaluate theoretical propositions is no longer credible and 
continued research within a given paradigm does not increase its 
applied value, but rather sustains a particular point of view. The 
construction of understanding according to one single perspective is 
limiting, whereas a multiplicity of perspectives contains survival 
values and breaking with the paradigm has more value than 
continued striving for verification. These ideas are congruent with 
Riegel's (1973) dialectical orientation to the generation of knowledge, 
which maintains that it is through comparison of competing 
perspectives that greater understanding is achieved. It would appear 
then that the positivist notion of science is a restricted one and that 
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only research that matched this view of science would be tolerated. 
The fact that the methodology was often inappropriate for research on 
humans was beside the point, as it was rigorous knowledge that 
scientists sought. Gergen ( 1985) claims that the positivists placed 
greater value on knowledge as an endpoint than on the means 
through which it is obtained. The ultimate utilization of knowledge 
was not given much attention; its quest was considered redeeming in 
itself. 
1.3. THE NATURALIST VERSUS ANTI-NATURALIST DEBATE 
The natural science approach which underlies the experimental 
method is the dominant paradigm in psychology. It is the legacy of 
the Vienna Circle logical positivists of the 1920's and 1930's. 
According to McCarthy ( 1984) this approach emphasized the unity in 
scientific approach where, despite differences in specific concepts and 
techniques in different domains of inquiry, the methodological 
procedures of natural science were considered applicable to the 
sciences of man; the logic of inquiry in both is the same. The goals of 
the inquiry are explanation and prediction. The scientific investigation 
of social and nonsocial phenomena was aimed at discovering lawlike 
generalizations that could function as premises in deductive 
explanations and predictions. The hallmark of scientific knowledge 
was its testability and to test a hypothesis, one used deductive logic to 
derive observation statements, whose falsehood would refute the test 
hypothesis. The hypothetico-deductive method was the means by 
which causal relationships were established. The empirical base of 
science was thus composed of observation statements that were said 
to report perceptual experiences or be motivated by such experiences. 
According to McCarthy (1984), Max Weber attempted to bridge the 
gap between the social and natural sciences and make possible the 
treatment of the social and the material in a systematic scientific 
manner. Weber defined sociology as a science that tries to understand 
social action in terms of causal explanations. He saw explanatory 
understanding as the placing of a particular act in an understandable 
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sequence of motivational actions that corresponds to an empirically 
verifiable regularity of behaviour. Habermas (1973) criticizes Weber 
for seeing the primary task of scientific analysis as discovering 
empirically reliable regularities of social action with a view to their 
employment in causal explanations and conditional predictions. For 
him the need for understanding the meaning of social actions is of 
secondary import. Habermas believes that the failure to understand 
meaning is the Achilles heel of the positivist theory of science. 
Vygotsky argued against a single-factor theory of development with a 
single explanatory principle. His argument was mainly aimed at 
biological reductionism and mechanistic behaviourism that were 
common practice in the 1920s and 1930s. He believed that there are 
multiple forces of development each with their own set of explanatory 
principles. For him the dynamics of ontogenesis rests on the 
assumption that the natural line of development, which produces 
functions in their elementary forms, may operate in relative isolation 
in early childhood. It is soon integrated with the cultural line, which is 
the elementary converted into higher psychological functions, through 
a process of emergent interactionism (Wertsch, 1985 ). Thus for 
Vygotsky, psychological functions emerge out of the social context and 
it is here, that he believed researchers should focus. 
Explaining behaviour requires not only psychological theory but also 
situational, biographical and historical information, in other words, 
contextual information. Psychology has for the most part tried to force 
its subject matter into the natural science mould by trying to study it 
in isolation from its context. Habermas ( 1971) criticizes 
behaviourism's attempts to transform statements about intentions 
and actions into statements about observable behaviour or into 
empiricist language. Statements about intentional actions belong to 
another level than first order statements about physical objects and 
their behaviour. Behaviourist theories of language fail in their 
attempts to reduce linguistic communication to verbal behaviour. 
Attempts to reduce meaning to behaviour fail to appreciate the 
internal connection to ideas that are constitutive of behaviour at the 
human level. Generality of knowledge gained from studies of animals, 
and within a narrow context, is severely limited. Human social 
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behaviour is meaningful behaviour, involving agents with intentions 
and expectations who are capable of choosing courses of actions 
(Koch, 1981). 
1.3.1. Hermeneutics 
According to Bhaskar (1979) the hermeneutic approach to science, 
founded in humanist culture, arose as part of the anti-naturalist 
reaction from the work of Schleiermacher (1838). This approach 
appeals to a difference in method between the natural and social 
sciences, based on the difference in subject matter. It believes that 
the elucidation of meaning and the tracing of conceptual connections 
is what the social sciences should be concerned with. It contrasts the 
science of the physical non-human world of nature with the science of 
the world of the mind, culture and history. For positivists, science is 
outside society and for hermeneutics society is outside science. Winch 
( 19 5 9) sees the difference between science and hermeneutics residing 
in both their methods and categories. Social science's method is 
conceptual and its main category is that of meaning; the natural 
sciences method is empirical and its category is causality. For Winch 
the natural sciences are concerned with causally regular behaviour, 
claims about which are found in observations of externally related 
elements. The social sciences are concerned with meaning and rule 
following with their main aim being establishing the connection 
between actions and meanings they express. Thus for Winch, 
explanation is achieved by understanding the way subjects give 
meaning to their lives. 
Bhaskar (1979) sees the gross inapplicability of positivism to social 
science as accounting for the plausibility of hermeneutics to 
hermeneuticists. The human sciences stand in a subject-subject 
relationship rather than a subject-object one; the difference between 
these relationships must be reflected methodologically. All theories of 
orthodox philosophy of science and their methods presuppose closed 
systems; hence they are inapplicable in the social sciences. For 
Bhaskar the Humean theories of causality and law, deductive-
nomological and statistical models of explanation, inductivist theories 
of scientific development and criteria of confirmation, Popperian 
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theories of scientific rationality and criteria of falsification, and 
hermeneutical contrasts parasitic upon them, must all be totally 
discarded. 
Bhaskar claims, however, that both positive naturalism and 
hermeneutics have a common commitment to the ontology of 
empirical realism and individualist sociology. Societies are real objects 
which are irreducible to simpler ones; hence he argues against 
methodological individualism. Likewise, the positivist tradition has to 
confront the problem of the direct scientific study of phenomena that 
only ever manifest themselves in open systems, where invariant 
empirical regularities do not obtain. The absence of closed systems 
does not mean that there are no social laws, but the criteria for 
rational assessment of theories cannot be predictive and the ref ore 
have to be explanatory. The identification of laws and empirical 
regularities are impossible outside closed systems. In the natural 
sciences the conditions for closed systems are sometimes there. The 
positivist leans on empirical criteria for ascribing reality to knowledge 
claims. This cannot do justice to the social sciences and psychology, 
where the objects cannot be made empirically manifest. Human 
sciences can be sciences in exactly the same sense, although not in 
exactly the same way, as the natural ones. For Bhaskar the root 
problems between the naturalist and anti-naturalist approaches lie in 
their acceptance of the anti-scientific trinity of empirical realism, 
sociological individualism and a commitment of the epistemic fallacy. 
Both Mead and Vygotsky rejected individual psychological 
reductionism. For Vygotsky, investigating individual responses before 
the collective, deals in his opinion with the second level in 
development. 
1.3.2. Activity Theory 
Harre and Secord (1972) call for a distinction to be made between the 
theory of movements, which is physiology and the theory of actions, 
which is the province of psychology. They claim that psychology has 
been studied without reference to its major phenomena, namely 
meanings, and without taking account of its main behaviour 
generating feature, namely the agency of people. 
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For Harre and Secord psychological activity is characterized by a 
reduction of biological determinants rather than a reduction to 
biological determinants. Human activity involves constructed 
responses whereas animals exhibit primarily biologically determined 
immediate responses to stimuli. Social acts are practical interactions 
which organize the psychological existence of humans. This is in 
agreement with Leontyev's activity theory which holds that thought is 
inseparable from practical social action (Leontyev, 19 81). If one 
wishes to ascertain the child's thought about something, one needs to 
take account of his activity. Thus when we see an action we connect 
what we see with a context which is conceptually different from the 
context of seeing movements. 
According to Harre and Secord (1972) human behaviour does not 
have the characteristic of things happening to it, rather it consists of 
things that people have made happen for various reasons. A person is 
the cause of their own actions; he or she is an agent taking care of his 
or her own acts. Action has significance and meaning and occurs in a 
social, not physiological, context. Action is the basic empirical concept 
and is different from movement. Movements are the vehicle for 
action. Harre and Secord maintain that the true subject matter of 
psychology is complex and deliberate actions. People are capable of 
intiating actions which may take place only after deliberation. The 
action sequence may be anticipated in a more or less clearly 
formulated plan. Most human action cannot be traced back to 
antecedent events. Harre and Secord believe that because an 
explanation makes references to plans, rules and intentions, this does 
not preclude it from being scientific. Attempts to characterize actions 
as movements result in a loss of meaning and character. Action is 
psychological and cannot be reduced to physiology or observed 
behavioural elements without being destroyed. Activity has always 
been eliminated from psychophysical experiments by vigorous 
controls. However, Gibson (1979) found that when he placed his 
subjects in an active, exploratory role that the crucial explanation of 
how we perceive lies in apprehending the invariances in our 
environment through active exploration. If this is so, then no amount 
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of experimentation in the framework of psychophysics will enable us 
to explain everyday perceptual phenomena. 
Contextualists stress the event as the unit of analysis. It is seen as a 
concrete action of everyday life that is set in time and consists of 
relations and activities that are continually changing. According to 
Jaeger and Rosnow (1988) this situates human activity within a 
sociohistorical and cultural milieu of relationships. Reality is 
constantly changing in contrast to the positivist notion of invariant 
order. Thus understanding and knowledge are no longer seen as 
linear process models of cause and effect but are loosely based on a 
synthesis of actions, events and experiences. According to this model, 
the ways of explaining have to do justice to the way the individual 
relates to their reality. The experiment is no longer accorded a 
primary explanatory function as it does not do justice to an unfolding 
event. Contextualism thus emphasizes the relativity of knowledge, for 
it is knowledge of action within specific socio-historical and cultural 
contexts that applies to developmental and transformative processes. 
Lev Vygotsky devoted much of his time to formulating the role of the 
social and historical context in psychological research. Much of his 
effort was stimulated by the need to create a Marxist psychological 
tradition. Many of his ideas, which have only recently been circulated 
and translated, are being taken up in the West. Many of his ideas 
were in unfinished form and his empirical claims untested due to his 
early death. His works were subsequently banned by Stalin and 
whilst some of his colleagues, like Leontyev and Luria, continued to 
work on his ideas, they have only recently become widely accessible. 
Vygotsky ( 19 7 8) saw practical human activity as playing the role of a 
general explanatory category and this activity as being the link 
between the external world and the human mind. Thus, for Vygotsky 
activity was not the subject of scientific inquiry, but was the 
explanatory principle in his work. He saw mental processes as 
determined by historically developed, , practical activity that 
incorporates tools. The semiotic mediation of human activity is what 
transforms humans. He drew a distinction between behaviour and 
action: action is located within specific cultural and historical 
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perspectives and time and behaviour as a mechanical description 
without narration. 
Many theorists have taken some of Vygotsky's ideas and used them to 
support their cause. Social constructionists have claimed him for their 
own, with his emphasis on the importance of word meaning. Others 
have taken his concept of the Zone of Proximal Development as an 
example of how to analyse the concept of activity in a natural setting 
as opposed to a laboratory. Most of his ideas are obtained through 
translations, some of which are contaminated by western 
conceptualization. Van Der Veer and Valsiner (1991) criticize the 
westernized versions of Vygotsky1 s theory which ignore the 
qualitative approach and interests he had in the dynamics of cognitive 
change. Newman and Holzman (1993) criticize the way the Marxian 
concept of activity has been passified into a setting. The zone of 
proximal development is not a place, but an activity in which we 
materially reorganize what there is to create a new meaning for 
everything. It is therefore not a zone, nor is anything in it. It is an 
anti-paradigm, a unity of historical nature, where what is essentially 
human emerges in meaning making activity. Newman and Holzman 
claim that the Zone of Proximal Development concept is threatened by 
a eurocentric bias and it is not a technique for individual or group 
learning. While it is gratifying to see how scientists are looking back 
into their past, they are not reworking old ideas as would be the case 
with a return to Piaget. Vygotsky's work is new to most and its 
novelty makes many forget the historical context in which he 
developed his views. Knowledge of his cultural and historical context 
would aid people in their understanding of his ideas. His views on 
word meaning and activity would not have placed him in the 
constructionist and hermeneutic camp, as he appeared to be seeking a 
more Marxian critical theory of science which would result in 
emancipatory action. 
The other side of the coin from activity theory as the object of 
inquiry, is the fact that scientific inquiry itself is a human activity. 
Actions in which scientists engage like observation, experimentation, 
measurement, concept formation, theory construction and testing are 
subject to certain rules, norms and standards. According to McCarthy 
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( 1984) the scientist is part of the social reality they wish to analyze. 
Their problems, interests, concepts and judgements all arise from, and 
belong to, the very traditions and institutions under investigation. 
Thus a theory that is critical needs to be conscious of its own origins 
in the historical and further development of society. 
Bhaskar's ( 197 5) view of activity theory is that society would not 
exist without human activity, but it is not the product of human 
activity. Society is the condition and the outcome of human agency. 
Humans, however, do not create society, they reproduce and 
transform it. Society always pre-exists people and is a necessary 
condition for their activity; it is an ensemble of structures, practices 
and conventions which individuals transform or reproduce, but would 
not exist unless they did so. Thus social structures unlike natural 
structures do not exist independently of activities they govern, nor do 
they exist independent of the agent's conceptions of what they are 
doing in their activity and, unlike natural structures, they may be 
only relatively enduring. According to Manicas (1987) social 
structures are almost never conscious and purposively produced, 
reproduced or transformed even though the activities on which they 
depend are conscious and purposive. Thus human action is the 
medium of social structures and it is with this that psychology is 
concerned. There is a difference in possible objects of knowledge 
between the natural and social sciences. In the natural world objects 
of knowledge exist and act independently of the process of production 
of knowledge of which they are objects, unlike the social sciences. 
Bhaskar ( 197 5) believes that the positivists ignore this 
interdependency and the hermeneuticists dissolve the intransitivity, 
where objects of knowledge do not depend on human activity. 
Hooker (1987) believes that one can give recognition to the historical 
and social dimensions of science, without incurring the social, cultural 
and political relativisms. He states that it is a mistake to believe that 
once science is acknowledged as a human activity, all prospects of 
epistemic objectivity disappear and are replaced with historical, 
sociological or political explanations. He believes this occurs because 
of the mistaken belief that there is only one kind of objective account 
of science possible. The appeal of the hermeneutic and activity 
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tradition seem to lie in placing behaviour, empiricist behaviour, in a 
context, with the view to making it more valid. It is still managed 
however, in the laboratory experimental paradigm, according to the 
natural science tradition, as Bhaskar points out. 
1.4. A REALISTIC THEORY OF SCIENCE 
Bhaskar (1979) believes that society can be studied in the same way 
as nature by an anti-positivist naturalism, which is based on a realist 
view of science. This view sees significant differences in methods 
between the two domains, which is grounded in the real differences in 
subject matters and in the relationship in which their sciences stand 
to them. Science is unified in the form that scientific knowledge takes, 
the reasoning by which it is produced and the concepts in terms of 
which its production can be adequately theorized or reconstructed. 
Bhaskar claims that the object of scientific activity is not the event or 
action in the hermeneutic tradition, nor the conjunctions in the 
positivist tradition, but structures and generative mechanisms. 
Activity is the medium in which structures are transformed and 
reproduced; thus activity does not produce or create them. Predicates 
that appear in the explanation of social phenomena will be different 
from those that appear in natural scientific explanations, but the 
principles that govern their production will remain substantially the 
same. Because social objects cannot be reduced to natural objects and 
so possess qualitatively different features, they cannot be studied in 
the same way. Yet they can still be studied scientifically. Bhaskar 
claims that both parties to the naturalist debate ignore this ontological 
gap between causal laws and their empirical grounds. This view of 
science where theories are explanatory and not predictive opens up a 
much wider field where methods can be applied to wider ranging 
topics. Researchers have been restricted to empirical levels in their 
research and this allows them more depth. 
Hooker (1987) believes that it is our cognitive control structures that 
now dominate our behavioural abilities, not our instinct or genes. 
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Science is now transforming the social conditions of human life as is 
seen in genetic interventions and cloning. Hooker suggests that science 
may be an adaptive mechanism for coping with survival; thus it is 
relative to each given culture. Empiricists see the social 
institutionalization of science as being irrelevant to its cognitive 
organization and content. Hooker believes that we need a better 
conception of science, society and human policies, which includes 
normative considerations. It would appear that this chapter has gone 
full circle, where at the beginning it was shown how positivist 
knowledge came to be seen as belonging to science, which excluded all 
things normative as belonging to metaphysics. The inadequacies of 
this approach have plagued science and psychology though the 
century and it is for this reason that Hooker suggests that we need a 
better conception of science. Western cultures have traditionally seen 
norms and facts as separate entities. However, as Habermas (1971) 
claims, the adoption of certain interests to the exclusion of others is 
ultimately a question of values and not facts, a matter for decision 
and not demonstration. Hooker cites the empiricist exclusion of 
normative considerations as leading to the fact/ value dichotomy. The 
normative has, however, entered science through its objects of study. 
He claims that there are a number of values that guide the activities 
of scientists, such as: increasing access to explanatory depth, 
explanatory precision, predictive scope, predictive precision, heuristic 
power, simplicity, technical applicability and reliability, sociocultural 
control, interpersonal communicative range and a rich cultural 
structure. Hence Hooker refutes positivism's claim to be value neutral 
as does Habermas who cites positivism's commitment to technological 
rationality behind a facade of value-freedom ( McCarthy, 1984 ). 
The scientific realist attempts to describe reality through theories 
which are intended true descriptions. Realists claim that there is no 
independent access to reality and the truth conditions of a proposition 
are assessed according to their meaningfulness and the conditions 
under which they are true are distinct from the conditions under 
which they are known to be true. This is a radical approach to science 
which aims at discovery and understanding instead of prediction and 
control. The goals of science are on a par with other life goals and 
science can be pursued with any goal in mind. This conception sees 
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science no longer as a separate, abstract endeavour but something 
that can have a multiplicity of goals, hence opening up areas to global 
understanding instead of atomistic approaches. 
Hooker is an advocate of the evolutionary naturalistic view which 
claims that we do not know in advance what the potential scope of 
hum.an knowledge is. Instead it is learnt as people and theories are 
studied. This is in agreement with Vygotsky's tenet that things only 
reveal themselves in movement and scientists need to look toward 
not only the actual level of development a child is at, but also to look 
towards their potential level. This is reflected in his notion of the zone 
of proximal development ( 19 7 8) which is " the distance between the 
actual developmental level as determined by independent problem. 
solving and the level of potential development as determined through 
problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more 
capable peers,"(p. 86). The potential level involves social interaction 
on an interpsychologial level and cannot be conceptuafi~1in terms of / 
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the individual's ability and is also congruent with Piaget's genetic 
epistemology of the 1970s. It would seem to emphasize a process 
rather than product orientation, which has significant implications for 
methodology. Logical positivism's view of the truth as an independent 
entity which can be accessed depending on one's measurement skills 
and hypothetico-deductive methodology has favoured a product 
orientation. This has flowed on to the research industry which has 
likewise favoured the product orientation of confirmation or 
disconfirm.ation of hypotheses. 
Naturalism is anti-anthropocentric and distances itself from the 
tendency humans have to project themselves onto all the world and 
value the world only in relation to their own kind. Evolutionary 
naturalist realism sees hum.ans as part of the world which they come 
to know through their interactions with it. This leads to a unity 
between scientific and philosophic theory. Hooker states that the two 
are interdependent, interact and should mutually cohere: philosophy 
offers a general theory of the world and it should cohere with the 
more specific view offered by science. Logical empiricism was 
anthropocentric in declaring as meaningless all assertions which are 
not verifiable by us. Realists believe that there are things in the world 
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that are real, but that we do not know; this does not take from them 
their existence or meaning. Evolutionary naturalist realism is thus a 
much broader notion of science than anything that has gone before. It 
places humans as evolutionary entities in a wider world context as 
opposed to the atomistic appproaches of the empiricists. It also has 
implications for a whole range of activities that see humans as one of 
the species on earth as well as one which has a wider responsibility 
than just to itself. Hooker stresses that many of our capacities may be 
communal or species capacities rather than intrinsically individual 
capacities. This is congruent with Vygotsky's idea of functions first 
occurring on the social plane and then being taken up onto the 
psychological plane. Vygotsky believed that social relations among 
people developmentally underlay all higher functions and their 
relationships. Hooker believes that our concept of self and our notions 
of reality may be more tied to being part of a socializing species than 
independent intrinsic properties of individuals. These notions all 
contradict the popular westernized view of the individual as being 
paramount where development takes place within the person. 
As was stated at the beginning of this chapter, any coherent account 
of science must take into account the biological, institutional and 
cultural context within which scientific activity occurs. This is in 
agreement with Vygoysky's belief in placing people and research in 
an historical, socio-cultural context. Modern science is a social 
institution which is heavily determined by its surrounding society. 
Hooker believes that institutions stand at the heart of what 
constitutes science and choice of methods is always a function of the 
available techniques of communication and argument and of existing 
institutional structures through which behaviour is moulded, and also 
a function of the ideals towards which society is moving. 
According to Hooker (1987) traditional philosophy of science regards 
science as an abstract structure which is separate from any activity of 
the scientist qua human. A scientific realist view sees theories of 
science as being literal descriptions of the physical world, as saying 
what there is and how it behaves. Thus the scientist is placed at the 
centre of the scientific activity and his knowledge, values, principles 
and beliefs are seen as relevant to the scientific study undertaken 
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(Feyerabend, 1963; Kuhn, 1962). Neglecting this context in which 
scientific activity takes place, reflects an empiricist view, which sees 
the institutional body of science as being irrelevant to its organization 
and content. Hooker sees the history of science as being a human 
artifact, which is subject to interaction between experimental choices 
and empirical evaluations. He believes that a critical theory of science 
is possible which can evaluate the historically conditioned 
psychosocial relationships that make up science. Critical theory is 
however in its infancy. Hooker sees objectivity as residing in an 
attitudinal structure of scientists. Scientists do not need a hard 
fact/value distinction but can obtain objectivity by taking open, 
critical, communicative approaches and submitting to scientific claims 
social processes of criticism before they are accepted. 
The realist view of science is one which holds attractions for scientists. 
Unfortunately in their methodology, many scientists often retreat 
back to behaviourist individualism and the tendency to identify or 
reduce objects of study to their empirical grounds (Bhaskar, 1979). 
Until researchers abandon or realize that their methodologies are still 
largely in the positivist tradition, they will be hamstrung in their 
research. 
This chapter has set out to trace the background in which current 
scientific research has evolved. The influences on the present context 
appear to owe much to the positivist tradition. Yet, while the 
philosophy of positivism itself has long since been abandoned by 
professional philosophers of science, its methodologies and traditions 
remain. It has been shown how the positivist experimental 
methodologies have been found to be flawed and inappropriate when 
dealing with humans. The desire of hermeneutics to separate the 
social from the natural sciences in order to be able to deal more 
effectively and appropriately with their subject matter, as well as the 
focus on activity and meaning of the agents, has led to a solution 
being offered that separates the social from the natural sciences. This 
would necessitate a return to the situation near the turn of the 
century when Vygotsky noted the fragmentation and lack of synthesis 
that was occurring in research. An alternative is to break with the 
current paradigm completely, instead of being in it or on its fringes. 
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The realist view of science seems to offer that alternative. It is not 
one that separates the sciences into kinds, but against the flow of 
disintegration and contradiction that characterizes psychology, offers 
a unified framework for the various sciences. It is a view of science 
which can accommodate the natural and social sciences with their 
different subject matters, yet still allows them to be studied 
scientifically. In an evolutionary sense realism places humans in the 
larger context of the world in which they function. However, it gives 
due regard to their differences from animals and among themselves, 
by accommodating different methods and approaches. 
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2 
Children and Research 
It is one hundred years since the births of both Piaget and Vygotsky in 
1896. It is appropriate on the anniversary of two of the most renowned 
developmental psychologists of the century, to take a look at the 
current state of developmental research with children. This chapter 
presents a contextual overview of current research with children, using 
some Vygotskian and Piagetian themes. 
In the previous chapter it was noted how much of current research 
takes place with little regard for the wider context in which it occurs. 
This can be seen to be in good part an outcome of the logical positivist 
tradition of science which has dominated much of scientific research 
this century. According to Toulmin ( 197 8) the fragmentation of 
psychology can be attributed to the still dominant neopositivist theory 
of the behavioural sciences that succeeded the old positivism of the 
1930s and 1940s. The root issue remains the very conception of science, 
its methods, tasks and their limits. The focus of logical positivism on 
reducing propositions to atomistic facts in order that they can be 
verified has led to a narrow perspective that seeks to control and 
reduce variables, rather than a focus that acknowledges the historical, 
social and cultural influences on scientific practice. 
In this chapter current research with children will be reviewed, with a 
specific focus on research being undertaken in the theory of mind area. 
The legacies of the logical positivist view of science will be uncovered in 
the cultural attitudes to childhood and the accompanying view of 
development. Piagetian and Vygotskian perspectives on development 
are explored, along with the interpretations and misinterpretations of 
Piagetian theory. Piagetian theory has been wrongfully dismissed on 
many accounts, not least because of its apparent focus on age as a 
criterion of development. Current research, however, is using age as a 
criterion in its attempts to find levels of competence in children at 
lower ages than has previously been demonstrated. 
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The relation between competence and performance is explored as well 
as the different experimental designs that occur as a result of the 
conceptualization of this relationship. Much research currently regards 
performance as being the result of causal hidden antecedent 
competencies. The logical connection between successful performance 
and successful attribution of a competence is argued for along with the 
fact that an unsuccessful performance is not necessarily a result of a 
faulty competence. This competence performance attribution is seen in 
the area of false belief tests, where researchers attempt to establish 
whether children understand misrepresentation. An understanding of 
misrepresentation is taken to be the equivalent to possession of a 
theory of mind. The reliance on the performance of the child in terms of 
linguistic responses is seen as indicating whether the child has mastered 
the ability to understand misrepresentations. Children are found to be 
unable to convey a successful performance of misrepresentation before 
the age of four. From the age of four onwards, they are seen to be able 
to understand different scenarios depicting misrepresentation. The false 
belief test appears to be a litmus test for a theory of mind, but the fact 
that successful performance on this test might not be indicative of 
successful competence is widely ignored by researchers. It is suggested 
that early competence be placed in a developmental perspective, and 
that it be seen as a precursor, and a domain-specific skill, that later 
leads to the establishment of a mature cognitive competence. 
The notion of whether children have a theory of mind is heavily reliant 
on one's view of what theories are, and this in turn stems from one's 
particular view of science. It will be seen that the current use of the 
term theory still reflects the logical-empiricist view of science. Henry 
Wellman's The Child's Theory of Mind (1990) has been influential in 
this area, with his depiction of theories. Much debate has arisen as to 
whether children come to understand other people through a theory or 
alternative views such as Goldman's ( 1993) simulation account or 
Robson's (1991) interpersonal relatedness account. The fact that many 
of the current notions of theory and the mind might be viewed in a 
socio-cultural and historical context escapes the attention of most 
researchers; that other cultures and other epochs might have 
alternative views is also dismissed. Most research has been done in the 
two to six year age range, with little interest in the broader lifespan 
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covering adolescents and adults. The possibility that some adults might, 
or might not, have a theory of mind is not challenged. 
Reporting adults' interviews with children reveals how experiments 
with children still reflect a mechanistic model of humans and a 
continued commitment to nonsocial doctrines of childhood. The question 
of whether to consider children's reports as data will be examined. 
Chapman ( 1991) suggests that they be considered as attempts at 
justification and not introspective reports of children's own cognitive 
processes. The motivation of assessments with children is explored in 
terms of a broader context. Meacham ( 1991) encourages a critical look 
at the motivational contexts that lie behind assessments with children 
and how this affects the procedures and tools used. The fact that the 
mind is now the focus of attention is explored and it is seen not to be as 
a result of a resolution of the mind/body problem, but stemming from 
the possibility of using the structures found in a child's mind through 
the simulation of artificial intelligence programmes. The view that 
children are seen on a similar level to animals and computers will be 
considered at the end of the chapter. The subordination of children and 
nature is likewise raised in this debate. The fact that many preschool 
children are now looked after in child care institutions is an example of 
how new things become the norm, how things become dominated by 
adults and humankind with their programmes of intervention and 
control. 
SECTION A: THE CONTEXT IN WHICH DEVELOPMENT OCCURS 
2.1. The Cultural Context of Childhood 
One's view of science determines one's view of childhood as a research 
topic and the methods one chooses to use. Likewise one's view of the 
child is determined by the cultural notions of childhood present in 
society. Kessen (1979) cites the dominant belief in the western world of 
the importance of the individual and of the self-contained child. The 
child is seen as an isolable entity who moves through their development 
as a self-contained and complete individual. The history and experience 
of a person is seen to be contained within their bordering skin (Kessen, 
199 3). Theories are based on the premise of individual development 
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and research is conducted within this perspective. The single child has 
become the unit of analysis and all features of childhood are seen to be 
located within the child. It is easier to study a child alone and this has 
become the accepted unit of analysis in child study. Methods for 
studying children have been driven by what the individual child can 
bring to the research laboratory. In 1979, Bronfenbrenner described 
developmental psychology as "the science of the strange behaviour of 
children, in strange situations with strange adults for the briefest 
possible periods of time" (p.19). This has similar overtones to Harre and 
Secord's comments on the mechanistic view of humans mentioned in the 
previous chapter. For Bronfenbrenner, Harre and Secord the social 
character of children is denied along with the social nature of 
psychological functions. 
A cost of the logical positivist desire for universalism has been the 
psychological search for a stable trait (and the earlier detected the 
better), a trait which is held to define or delimit a person. Kessen (1993) 
uses the Intelligence Quotient as an example of the elevation of a 
number as the best single measure of humanity by which physicians, 
lawyers and scholars are chosen. Kess en calls the desire for a closed 
system a crime, where childwatchers force their observations, first, into 
general principles and then, into a system and, not infrequently, into a 
cult. Kessen claims that while there are regularities in human behaviour 
that, say, stop humans from falling in love with frogs, it is important 
that developmental psychology discard its desire for the one best 
system, theoretically or methodologically. Hatch (1995) claims that the 
above themes reflect positivistic notions of childhood as an objective, 
definable entity that researchers can come to know if they perfect their 
measuring tools and adequately control for intervening variables. 
Bruner (1986) argues that cultural beliefs about young children are 
arbitrary and deeply rooted. He claims that there is an incorrect view of 
the young child as egocentric, who is seen to be incapable of taking 
others' perspectives and who must be brought to sociality through 
development and learning. There is a belief that this individualistic self 
that develops and is determined by the univeral nature of humans, is 
beyond culture. The outer public world finally becomes represented in 
the inner, private one through processes like identification and 
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internalization. The child's growing knowledge of the world is seen to be 
achieved principally through direct encounters with the world rather 
than mediated by vicarious encounters and negotiating with others. 
Sampson ( 1987) describes the culturally prescribed developmental 
process as being "I before We". The socially constituted, self-contained 
individual fails to promote the levels of self-cohesion necessary for a 
collectivity to manage itself without centralized and firm external 
governance. Sampson claims that society creates a person who is 
fundamentally at war with society, which must then intervene in order 
to maintain the social order that its created person threatens. In merely 
reporting the empirical findings it discovers, and in treating then as 
though they were eternal truths of human existence, rather than 
sociohistorical constructions, psychology generates knowledge which 
helps sustain current practices and institutions. The prevailing view of 
childhood seems to conveniently fit the positivistic notions of 
experimentation. A focus on the interdependence of children and their 
support systems would be very difficult to study under closed 
laboratory situations. 
Ratner ( 1991) claims that research with children attributes nonsocial 
characteristics and origins to psychological phenomena. This is similar to 
empiricism, which sees psychological phenomena as independent 
entities whose qualities are fixed and only vary quantitatively. 
Empiricist methodology precludes comprehending the child as being an 
integral part of a wider, dynamic and changing society. Society is 
dissolved into independent factors whose origin and character are 
assumed to be given, thus denying its sociohistorical character. 
However, science needs to dispel the illusion that psychology stems 
from nonsocial sources and shift the focus from psychology's long-time 
obsession with the individual to that of investigating the 
interdependence of people within socio-historical contexts. 
Vygotsky (1987) urged the investigation of the historical child and not 
the eternal child. One of his main tenets was that psychological 
functions occur first on the social plane and are then taken onto the 
psychological plane. This was his general genetic law of cultural 
development, which reflected the Marxist tradition where the 
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individual response emerges from the collective life. Functions occur 
first between people as an interpsychological category and then within 
the child as an intrapsychological category. Human learning presupposes 
a system by which children grow into the intellectual life of those 
around them, and acquire a vicarious consciousness. The scaffolding 
provided by the mother is a type of consciousness loan as she is always 
on the growing edge of the child's competence. Vygotsky's views offer a 
contextual approach to the study of childhood which a positivistic view 
of science cannot accommodate. Such an approach does not allow a 
reduction of structures to atomistic facts, nor does it tolerate a focus on 
separate abilities to the exclusion of others. It insists on a psychological 
explanation that is regulated by socio-historical, not biological processes. 
Vygotsky spoke against a single-factor theory of development with a 
single explanatory principle. He saw such a view as serving the 
biological reductionism that was prevalent in the 1930s. 
2.2. The Developmental Perspective in Current Research 
Vygotsky placed the study of development at the core of all psychology. 
He believed that a body would only show itself in movement and that 
ignoring development would present an inadequate picture of the 
structures under investigation. Such a conception of psychology would 
preclude a closed systems approach in the laboratory because it could 
not accommodate this concept of dynamic movement. An open systems 
approach to inquiry would be appropriate, however, as Bhaskar (1979) 
has noted. Here causal laws have to be interpreted as historical 
tendencies and not regularities according to Humean law. The scientific 
realist view of science would accommodate this view with its 
acknowledgement that we do not know things in advance. Its emphasis 
on theory generating and discovery, as opposed to the verificationist 
and testing emphasis of much in the past, would find congruence with a 
developmental approach focussed on process rather than product. The 
focus would be on the generating mechanisms behind competencies as 
opposed to the performance or manifestation of them. 
Chandler and Chapman ( 1991) describe the traditional task of 
developmental psychology as detailing the competencies that regularly 
differentiate persons of different ages and accounting for the timing of 
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the sequencing of such abilities. Vygotsky (1978) 1 believed that similar 
events occurring at different ages of the child is reflected in the child's 
consciousness in completely different ways and have entirely different 
meanings for different children. He criticized the Western use of IQ tests 
which tested only completed development on the grounds that one 
cannot assume that completed development fully specifies a trajectory 
for the future. Most research has focussed on the products of concept 
formation and not the process or the developmental course of that 
formation. Bronfenbrenner's (1977) open systems approach to 
development challenges the traditional quest for prediction of 
developmental outcomes and the search for the invariant trajectory of 
development. Developmental outcomes are impossible to predict on the 
basis of the initial conditions present in the system. The basis of this 
unpredictability and variance lies in the interdependence of the child 
and the environment. The developing child acts within a context and 
transforms the structure of that context ( Rogoff and Wertsch, 1984). 
By contrast, a metascientific approach that can accommodate the 
evolutionary, dynamic, transformational nature of development can be 
found instead in scientific realism, in particular, Hooker's (1987) 
evolutionary, naturalistic realism described in chapter one. 
Chapman and Chandler (1991) describe the current situation in 
developmental psychology as an embarrassment. Each new wave of 
research details more divergent claims about almost any milestone; 
children are said to be able to deduce or behave in intentional ways 
between five months to fifteen years of age, depending on whom one 
reads. Chapman and Chandler claim that there are no clear guidelines 
for deciding when various human competencies develop. They believe 
that Piagetian theory drove a wedge between generations of 
developmental students. Before the cognitive revolution of the early 
1960s, a premature consensus existed about how quickly young people 
come to participate in psychological ways of being that are 
fundamentally adult-like; in other words, how quickly children become 
little adults. This tendency of 'adultopomorphism' was to be found in 
the writings of most of twentieth century experimental child 
1 Mind and Society was first published in 1934 and again in 1978, when it was 
translated from the Russian. Most of Vygotsky's works were banned under 
Stalin and have only recently been circulated and translated into English; 
hence the two publication dates. 
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psychologists. It was aided by psychodynamic theorists, who helped 
adult patients reconstruct their childhood, driven by the misleading 
assumption that children were miniature adults. In the early decades of 
North American psychology there was little to suggest that the basic 
competencies of young children might be fundamentally different from 
that of more knowledgeable adult counterparts. 
Piaget's legacy on education has been great, for he realized that children 
are constructive thinkers who will only learn what they are structurally 
ready to learn. This view has had a large influence on educational 
theory and practice. Flavell ( 1996) suggests that many of Piaget's 
contributions have become so much a part of the way we view cognitive 
development nowadays, that they are difficult to distinguish from the 
mainstream literature. Piaget's theory enlightened researchers about 
the fact that children were qualitatively different from adults in their 
basic competencies for processing and organizing experience. 
Developmental psychologists subsequently set about trying to prove 
how competencies of children differed from those of adults. 
Rogoff ( 1993) claims that the work of Vygotsky, Gibson, Piaget and 
Dewey fit together and provide a basis for a sociocultural theory of 
development. They share an emphasis that has yet to be understood in 
mainstream developmental psychology. Vygotsky and Piaget share an 
emphasis on understanding human processes through studying 
development, an approach to scholarly inquiry that contrasts with the 
study of static forms of thought without concern for their 
transformation. Gibson and Vygotsky share a conception of thinking as 
process rather than acquisition and possession, while Dewey and 
Vygotsky set out to explain the question of the role of social interaction 
in cognitive development. 
Chandler and Chapman cite a third perspective of the 1970s and 1980s 
which tried to demonstrate that children acquire various cognitive 
competencies at a significantly earlier age than had been thought 
possible. The common target was Piaget's theory, and the common 
assumption was that the assessment strategies on which his theory 
relied unwittingly incorporated various performance factors which were 
unrelated to the competencies presumably being tested. It appeared 
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that Piaget had underestimated children's true abilities. Dean and 
Youniss ( 1991) claim that American psychologists have redefined 
competence on Piagetian tasks in terms of performance criteria. Piaget's 
interest was however in the structure of actions and interactions with a 
subject-object relationship that was conceptualized as being reciprocal. 
He granted power to the person to construct meanings for objects, 
whereas American psychologists have granted the stimulus power to 
force reactions in the subject or person (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969). 
Dean and Youniss ( 1991) call for an attempt to recapture the original 
framework in which Piaget operated so that a new generation of 
researchers might be offered a view of issues that have disappeared 
through successive transformations of Piaget's original project (Gold, 
1987). 
Flavell (1962) anticipated some of the problems that would arise when 
Piaget's writings were brought into American psychology 
"(Piaget) sees problems we would not be likely to see, he attacks 
these problems with methods different from those we would 
espouse, and he often theorizes about his results in ways which 
seem esoteric and even incomprehensible to us. For better or worse, 
it seems to be true that anything like an adequate understanding of 
Piaget's system demands a certain reorientation and acclimatizing-a 
certain holding in abeyance of habitual ways of looking at things, at 
least until it all starts to come clear"(p. 16). 
Flavell's fears were well founded as Piaget repeatedly clashed with 
American psychologists over concepts, methods and purposes. In 
contrast to the strict separation enforced by Anglo-American 
psychology between fact and theory, observation and interpretation, 
Piaget interspersed theory with justification and avoided quantitative 
data where possible. According to Burman (1996) Piaget's exploratory, 
individually oriented tool of research was turned into a standardized 
assessment package by Anglo-American psychologists. Many of Piaget's 
tasks have become diagnostic assessment devices. Burman claims that 
Piaget's method of studying the growth of knowledge has been taken to 
be a theory of child development. 
Burman (1996) claims that Piaget's interest in the epidemiological 
status of children's beliefs has been turned into a model of concept 
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acquisition be Anglo-American psychologists. Lourenco and Machado 
( 1996) claim that data that invalidate the age criteria in Piagetian 
protocols, do not inflict much serious conceptual damage, as Piaget's 
major focus was on transformations. Smith ( 1991) criticizes Piaget 
(1983), who despite denying that age is a criterion, frequently drew 
conclusions about children's ages in reviewing his own empirical work. 
Piaget's theoretical account supports the expectation that age is not a 
criterion of a child's stage of development, but his empirical accounts 
embody conclusions about relation of age to developmental level. Smith 
maintains that an alternative interpretation of Piaget's theory is needed, 
where age is an indicator and not a criterion of developmental level. 
There is a difference between criteria and indicators; a criterion is 
universally valid and formulates properties that must be present or 
absent, whereas an indicator can have exceptions as it depends on 
relative frequencies. Smith goes further by claiming that age is just one 
of many variables that get invoked. Social class, for example, is a 
variable that plays an equally important role, yet it rarely gets invoked. 
This fixation on age as a criterion is illustrated by Ruffman, Olson and 
Astington (1991), who carried out a study on children's understanding 
of visual ambiguity. They used 108 subjects aged between three and six 
years to determine whether children begin to understand that 
ambiguous visual cues are an insufficient source of knowledge. Previous 
research has shown this to occur around six years of age (Taylor, 1988). 
Ruffman et al wanted to determine whether this development occurs 
around the age of four, when children begin to understand related tasks 
like the false belief task. They found almost no three year olds 
recognised that the other could identify the unambiguous pair, but not 
the ambiguous pair, but about half the four year olds and most five and 
six year olds could do so. They then concluded that an understanding of 
ambiguity develops around age four, and that there is one stage at 
which this occurs rather than two. This research is typical of current 
efforts and bears similarities to the false belief research, with the focus 
on the age at which performance seems to change, rather than focussing 
on the change and the mechanisms responsible for it. 
Piaget was criticised for his alleged view of development as proceeding 
from absence to presence. However this is a misinterpretation for he 
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had a constructivist view which saw development as a progressive 
transformation, differentiation and integration. Ruffman et al's (1991) 
experiment could also be criticised on the grounds of not seeing visual 
ambiguity in terms of a process orientation. Piaget allowed for different 
stages in the epistemic process of knowing. Piaget's theory of 
intellectual development was a normative theory, in that it dealt with 
competencies that could be possessed with varying degrees of 
accomplishment (Wood and Power, 1987). Thus Piaget saw a difference 
between a successful display of an ability and a high ability, which most 
researchers tend to ignore. Piaget has also been criticized for neglecting 
the role of the social context in his formulations. However, he rejected 
social empiricism as reducing social factors to independent variables 
that accelerated or decelerated development and preferred to see social 
interactions as being embodied in the cognitive structures which were 
the real focus of his attention. 
Case ( 1992) sees different directions in developmental research 
emerging from the early 1980s. The first is the neo-Piagetian one which 
retains Piaget's general-systems perspective, but introduces a stronger 
set of assumptions concerning the specificity of children's conceptual 
learning and its environmental dependence. A second direction was 
taken in response to some of Chomsky's assumptions that the mind is 
essentially modular. Within any of these modules there is a great deal 
of internal structure, some of which is present at birth. As they get 
older and come into contact with physical and cultural experience, 
children's pre-wired structures become re-worked into more 
sophisticated systems or theories (Carey, 1985; Karmiloff-Smith, 1989). 
It is interesting to note that Gopnik (1996), a proponent of the theory-
theory view which is discussed later, subscribes to this modular 
approach. She asserts that social interaction cannot be a mechanism for 
cognitive change but could be an important condition in develpment. 
Pinker ( 1994) is another who proposes a modular account of semantic 
development. A third direction was taken by investigators who were in 
agreement with neo-innatist theorists in suggesting that cognitive 
structures are domain-specific ( Chi, 19 8 8). 
All these trends in developmental psychology have occurred within a 
lifetime of a researcher; there are advocates of every kind of 
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perspective. The meaning of concepts is now frequently replaced by 
arguments about methodological procedures by those who claim to have 
discovered a lower bound of some competence and others defending the 
legitimacy of some higher or lower threshold of that same ability. 
2.3. Competence and Performance 
If the proper task of developmental psychology is the detailing of 
competencies that differentiate people of differing ages and the 
accounting for the timing of the sequencing of such abilities ( Chandler & 
Chapman, 1991), then how does one test for the presence or absence of 
a competence? Cognitive competence has to be viewed in the context of 
the relevant task and sociocultural constraints. Chandler defines 
competence concepts as being normative and explanatory, not 
descriptive or empirical generalisations. They seek to elucidate the 
causes of actual concrete performances. He outlines different ways of 
seeing the competence performance relation: the first is a strict 
performance theory, which seeks an understanding between behaviour 
and the stimulus giving rise to it. The second is a straight competence 
theory which sees the aptitude for using a capacity as an integral part 
of the capacity itself. The third is the view that sees performance as 
being causally determined by competence, where the approach is 
hypothetico-deductive with the goal of developing an explanatory 
framework in which competence can be seen as the explanatory cause 
of which manifest behaviour is the effect (Olson, 1978). The fourth is 
the view that competence concepts explain performance where the 
method is abductive (Peirce, 1931). Here behaviour is seen to be a clue 
to the pattern or meaning that cuts across it (Fodor and Garnett, 1966). 
Chandler rejects the first two out of hand as one cannot collapse the two 
concepts of performance and competence into each other. Models that 
reduce competence to the variables assumed to be responsible for 
producing observed patterns of behaviour are seen to be incorrect. 
Making real-life predictions about concrete behaviours, requires honing 
in on the measurement of competence. Chandler believes that there are 
too many possible candidates to be antecedent variables, where the 
absence of one must imply the absence of a successful performance. 
Thus one can never be certain whether failure on a given testing 
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procedure is because of the absence of a particular competence or 
because of a deficit in performance (Einhorn and Hogarth, 19 81). The 
result is that faulty competence cannot be established from faulty 
performance and every causal theory that treats manifest behaviours as 
the effect of some competence veers towards solipsism. Another 
problem with trying to construe competence as a causal factor in 
performance, is the tendency to favour earlier and earlier attributions 
of competence. This occurs when behaviours that confirm the presence 
of an hypothesized ability are accepted and are read as direct 
manifestations of that competence, while those that fail to do so are 
dismissed on technical measurment grounds (Lopez, 1981). The age at 
which a given competency is ascribed moves inexorably downward as 
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experimental evidence accumulates, while on certain oqcassioljls people 
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choose not to display an ability that they undoubtedly have. 
Chandler favours the fourth approach to the competence-performance 
relation, an approach which seeks not to predict what individuals will 
do next, but to utilise particular performances as clues to the existence 
of some structure that gives meaning to the specific actions in question 
(Fodor and Garnett, 1966). The methodological approach centers on 
sifting through behaviours to find a pattern of structures and 
transformational rules. This is an abductive approach which seeks to 
explain the underlying mechanisms of structures. Abduction is a process 
of reasoning to an explanation. The relationships are therefore ones of 
identification of presumed effects back to an underlying cause. Because 
the relations between competencies and their manifestations are not 
contingent, but matters of identification, the business of predicting one 
from the other is made incoherent. This suggests a method that is 
abductive rather than empirical-analytic, where behaviours are seen as 
clues to the patterns or meanings that cut across them (Fodor and 
Garnett, 1966). 
Fischer, Bullock, Rotenberg and Raya ( 199 3) expand the notion of 
competence as an emergent characteristic of a person in a context, and 
not of the person alone. Competence arises from the collaboration 
between the person and context, with competence changing when the 
context changes. Fischer et al claim that theories of competence have 
been fundamentally flawed by their focus on the organism and their 
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failure to recognise the contributions of the context to competence. They 
criticise the view that people's competence is described as a fixed 
capacity analagous to the amount of liquid that can be placed in a glass. 
This view holds that whatever context the child is in, the competence 
remains the same. Fischer et al suggest the notion of a skill as a starting 
point. A skill requires a collaboration between the person and the 
context. Skills therefore vary not only between people but also across 
contexts for one given person (Fischer and Farrar, 1988). Skill replaces 
the organismic definition of competence with the idea that capacities 
literally arise from the collaboration of a person with a context. 
SECTION B: THEORY OF MIND RESEARCH 
2. 4. Children and Chimpanzees 
Theory of mind research was precipitated by Premack and Woodruff's 
(1978) speculations about the chimpanzee's understanding of mind. 
Woodruff and Premack were interested in whether chimps could 
predict what an actor would do next by observing the actor's efforts and 
inferring his or her underlying goal. A correct prediction would require 
the chimp to realize that the agent would not act in accordance with the 
state of the world, but rather in accordance with a mental 
representation of the world. Secondly, it would require the chimp to set 
aside its own representation of the world and take into account 
another's mistaken representation. If the chimp could grasp that an 
agent would act in accord with his own belief, even if that belief were 
false, it would clearly show that the chimp could make genuinely 
psychological predictions based on reading of the agent's mental state. 
Woodruff and Premack claimed that chimpanzees could impute mental 
states to others because Sarah, their subject, could choose the correct 
photograph from a selection that solved her problem; thus she could be 
said to have a theory of mind. This study has triggered a wave of 
testing on children's understanding of the mind. 
It must be remembered that experiments were preferred with animals 
in the logical positivist tradition as it was easier to control all the 
variables and easier to administer the treatments in a laboratory. The 
preference for observing phenomena in animals to observing them in 
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children completely ignores the likely fact that children operate in a 
social world and acquire meaning in a completely different way from 
animals; it hints at a view of children as being on the same level as 
animals. Kessen (1996) claims that in the 1950s rats were more popular 
in developmental research than children. Van Der Veer and Valsiner 
( 1994) describe this as the animilization of child psychology, when the 
response of a three year old is equated to the response of an ape. While 
speech is noted by all as present in the process of solution finding with 
humans, it is treated as a secondary factor and is equated to the arm 
length of the ape and regarded as a direct response to a stimulus. Van 
Der Veer and Valsin er believe that researchers fail to acknowledge that 
with speech the child acquires a fundamentally different attitude to the 
situation in which the solution of practical problems is carried out. From 
a psychological point of view, the child's practical actions represent a 
completely different structure. According to a scientific realist view of 
science, researchers should be concerned with the structures of our 
competencies and not the realization of them, as is the case with animal 
research. It appears that the dominant mode of research with children 
appears to be restricted to a superficial, empirical level. 
2. 5. Representational Competence 
According to Sigel et al ( 19 9 3) a child understands the notion of 
representational competence when they understand the 
representational rule that any event, object or person can be 
represented in some symbolic form and still retain its original meaning. 
Thus a car still retains its identity whether represented by a word or a 
picture. Understanding that a picture and an object clearly differ, yet 
share a common meaning, reflects a knowledge of the representational 
rule. This forms the basis for representational competence. Theory of 
mind research involves looking at children's understanding of mental 
states. It refers to our ability to make sense of behaviour in terms of 
mental states. Researchers have invoked the related concepts of belief 
and desire as explanatory concepts in the understanding of intentional 
acts. Dennett ( 197 8) proposed that to demonstrate a true awareness of a 
mental state, the subject would have to take into account another 
person's incorrect belief about a situation. Thus the false belief test was 
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suggested as being crucial because a prediction based on a person's true 
belief could be made by assessing the actual state of the world rather 
than the person's mental representation. A prediction based on a 
person's false belief is derived from the person's representation of the 
state of the world rather than what is actually true. This has resulted in 
volumes of research being done on the understanding of false belief in 
children, a task which is based on the notion of representational 
competence. Mastery of false belief tasks has been taken as evidence 
that children understand that people can represent the same object or 
event in different ways. 
The initial test was that of Wimmer and Ferner ( 1983) with Maxi and 
the chocolate. A child is told that Maxi thinks that the chocolate is in one 
place. Maxi then goes away. While he is away the chocolate gets moved 
to another place. The child is then asked by the investigator where he 
thinks Maxi will look - in the place where he last left it or in the place 
where the child knows it has been moved to. Apparently children under 
four years of age have great difficulty in understanding that Maxi will 
still go and look for the chocolate in the place he last saw it. They 
believe he will look for it in the place they know it to be. Children aged 
four and up seem to understand that Maxi will still look in the position 
he last saw the chocolate and that he has a false belief about where it is. 
Children are then asked what they know and what Maxi knows 
(Butterworth, 1991). 
The focus of this test is conservation or representation; that is, whether 
the child understands that the meaning of an instance is retained, in 
spite of change in form or symbolic level. This representational 
competence is necessary to perform any psychological task beyond the 
level of sensorimotor functioning. Piaget ( 1962) defined representation 
as "characterized by the fact that it goes beyond the present, extending 
the field of adaptation both in space and time. In other words, it evokes 
what lies outside the immediate perceptual and active field" (p. 273) 
and further, " we use the word representation in two different senses. 
In its broad sense, representation is identical with thought, that is with 
all intelligence which is based on a system of concepts or mental 
schemas and not merely on perceptions and actions. In its narrow sense, 
representation is restricted to the mental memory image that is the 
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symbolic evocation of absent realities," (p. 67). Representations 
therefore involve the understanding of the principle of the transference 
of symbols and the understanding of the relationships among 
nonobservable events (Sigel,1991). 
Chandler (1988) claims that false belief tests and other procedures, 
which are meant to test the child's ability to distinguish between seeing 
and not seeing, share the common feature of gerrymandering specific 
people into positions of relative ignorance by guaranteeing they were 
poorly placed to access the full information which was readily available 
to others better situated. This results in the child being at the wrong 
place or the right place at the wrong time. The only difference is 
whether space or time was manipulated to guarantee one being better 
informed than the other. In his view, privileged information and false 
belief tests measure the same thing. Chandler maintains that if 
mastering false belief tests are enough to demonstrate possession of a 
theory of mind, then the same should be said of two year olds who 
understand that more information is better than less. Mastering false 
belief tests does not signal an appreciation of many interpretations of 
reality. Rather, it shows that different realities support different 
interpretations. The ability to represent and entertain multiple 
representations does not necessaily mean that anything is maturing. It 
is possible that something might merely be becoming more complex. ·, 
Chandler claims that for methodological rather than substantive reasons 
registering certain beliefs as false is less of a watershed than is claimed. 
Mitchell (1994) sees young children's preoccupation with reality as 
being adaptive. He views this from an evolutionary perspective where 
development takes the form of smooth evolution rather than conceptual 
revolution. When young children are forced to make judgements about 
misrepresentations which have no basis in reality, Mitchell believes that 
they judge incorrectly because they consult reality. Reality is relevant 
for young children, because they have to master their physical 
environment in order to sustain an independent existence. Mitchell 
claims that misrepresentations and notions of false belief are not 
relevant tools for young children until they are projected more into the 
social realm. Chandler (1988) believes that preschoolers' beliefs have 
their origins in the external environment and their mental structures 
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correspond to those of reality. Doubts occur only if one is in the wrong 
place. Reality is known with absolute certainty. In middle childhood the 
ability to consider higher order beliefs develops, and this can cause 
specific doubts. Biases which confound knowledge, however, do not 
force the child to give up their realistic theory of mind for a more 
constructivist one. The child is convinced that if there are two different 
meanings to the same facts, one meaning is definitely mistaken. 
Likewise Samuels and Taylor (1992) have found that in nonemotional 
situations children do not have trouble distinguishing between reality 
and pretence, whereas, in emotional situations Taylor has found that 
children use their emotions as a cue to reality. These are two variables 
that have been competely ignored by researchers. 
The false belief test also ignores the knowledge base of the self, the 
subject of the beliefs and desires who is situated in a historical context 
and who has beliefs and desires that are themselves part of history. The 
fact that representational competence is a product of socialization which 
is initially experienced within the family context is likewise ignored. 
Children engage with their parents and peers and encounter a variety of 
opportunities to become involved in language and the sharing of space 
and objects. The child's ability to represent an object which is absent or 
an event that is not perceived is the building block for the ability to 
misrepresent an object or event or to understand this 
misrepresentation. Dunn ( 1991) has noted the importance of family 
discourse in the development of children's understanding of others' 
psychological states. She has found that settings in which 
understandings of others' psychological states occur are rarely 
emotionally neutral. She postulates that the socioemotional capacities 
may contribute to reflection. Emotionally urgent situations that occur 
within the daily dramas of family interactions have rarely been studied. 
A child's understanding develops in a social context and will vary across 
different relationships for the same child. Dunn sees it as paradoxical 
that in the matter of children's understanding of their own and others' 
thoughts, desires and feelings, the role of social interaction has been 
little studied. 
There appears to be a bias in trying to pinpoint at exactly which age the 
false-belief test can be mastered. Many researchers appear to be 
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quibbling over whether it begins at eighteen months, at which time 
Ferner (1991) describes children as situation theorists, or as Wellman 
( 199 3) suggests, at two and a half years where children understand the . 
hypothetical nature of mind but not its causal nature. The focus seems 
to be on age as a criterion and not on competency. The results of false 
belief tests show that three year olds are limited in their ability to 
reason about false belief, whereas by the age of five they have 
overcome most of the difficulties associated with this experimental task. 
Gopnik, Slaughter and Meltzoff ( 1994) describe the development of a 
theory of mind before the age of two and a half as being characterized 
by an egocentric, nonrepresentational understanding of perception 
which is seen in joint attention, social referencing and object 
permanence abilities. Gopnik et al claim that at two and a half years 
children clearly understand nonrepresentational states of perception 
and desire as they can solve simple desire tasks and manage 
perspective-taking tasks. At the age of three they show better 
understanding of the representational aspects of desire and also 
understand level one perception even when the question is phrased in 
terms of belief. At the age of four the accumulation of counter evidence 
leads the child to generalise the notion of misrepresentation from 
perceptual contexts and develop a widely applicable notion of false 
belief. It is obvious that the focus of the tests seem to be the age at 
which the performance succeeds. 
It would seem, then, that theory of mind research illustrates Chandler's 
warning about taking performance as being causally determined by 
competence. The failure by three year olds to master false belief tests 
cannot confidently be said to be caused by an absence of competence or 
a deficit in performance. One cannot establish faulty competence from 
the faulty performance of the failure to understand the false belief 
situation. Chandler sees this as being an explanatory dodge which is 
meant to rescue the claims of so-called competency theories from the 
possibility of refutation (Sampson, 1981). Lourenco and Machado (1996) 
warn that correct performance may be explained by low level matching 
strategies and may not necessarily be the result of deductive reasoning, 
which theory of mind researchers claim is the case. 
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Despite claims to the contrary, Piaget did not argue for the evidence of 
an inability, for one cannot prove a negative, but rather for the absence 
of evidence of an inability. This point links up with the asymmetry 
between successful and unsuccessful performance predictions. When 
children's performance is assessed by the use of operational criteria and 
satisfies those criteria, the inference is that the child possesses a 
corresponding ability. When the child's performance does not satisfy the 
criteria, the inference to draw is more difficult. Successful performance 
warrants attribution of some ability, unsuccessful performance leaves 
open the question of which abilities a child has. Piaget saw development 
as a progressive differentiation of abilities and not a sudden presence 
from absence for which he has been criticised. An example of Piaget's 
( 1926) progressive differentiation is demonstrated in his conservation 
tasks where with stage one (nonconservation), stage two (empirical 
conservation) and stage three (necessary conservation), he 
distinguished between three epistemic states. He did this in terms of his 
levels of concrete thought: preoperational, intermediate and operational 
thought. The intermediate ability of empirical conservation represented 
an advance on nonconservation because correct judgements can 
sometimes be given. It is not as advanced as stage three or necessary 
conservation, because incorrect judgements are still possible and the 
judgement is based on its truth value (true or false), rather than its 
modal status, (empirical or necessary). Modality presupposes truth 
value and so stage three thinking cannot precede stage two. This 
differentiation of abilities is not evident in much developmental 
research, nor in theory of mind research. As soon as children can master 
the false belief test they are claimed to have a theory of mind, which is 
not regarded as a precursor to a more mature, later developing theory 
of mind. The focus of the false belief tests does not appear to be of a 
developmental nature, with initial sightings of competencies that later 
consolidate and generalise across contexts into a differentiated 
competency or ability. 
Carpendale and Chandler ( 1996) claim that the false belief 
understanding has been equated with the more demanding notion of 
interpretation. Most theorists believe that the only true difference 
between four year olds' and adults' understanding of the mind is 
qualitative and skill driven. Carpendale and Chandler oppose this 'one 
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miracle' view of epistemic development. They claim that interpretive 
understanding only begins around the ages of six, seven and eight. False 
belief tests are about matters of truth telling and relative ignorance and 
not about the interpretive nature of the knowing process. 
The problem with the false belief test is that it focusses on 
representations, the material of thought, in the same way hermeneutics 
focusses on events or acts. According to Sigel ( 1991) a correct answer is 
an index of the child's conformity to adult standards and does not 
reveal the process of the child's thought. An incorrect answer is more 
ambiguous as it may reflect a lack of knowledge, a lack of 
understanding of the question or an instance of a child's logic. The focus 
is on a response to an event, not the generating mechanism behind it; it 
also assumes that the performance is causally related to some 
competence, along the lines of the regularity theory. 
Campbell ( 1996) claims that mental representations are normally taken 
to be static structures in the mind. Correspondence with structures of 
elements outside the mind is what makes them mental representations: 
there, the commitment is to static structures and correspondence. 
Campbell claims that the correspondence notion is incoherent as the 
system would be required to know its own structure that does the 
representing, the structure in the environment that is being 
represented and the correspondence between them. He proposes the 
interactivist alternative which has an affinity with a dynamic systems 
conception. The commitment is to considering mental process and not 
structure. This process oriented conception of the mind is congruent 
with a scientific realist focus on generative mechanisms or generic 
causes that lie behind structures. 
2. 6. The Older Child's Theory of Mind 
Vygotsky ( 197 8) postulated that it was only in adolescence that 
thinking in concepts occurs. Formations that are present before this are 
functionally equivalent to the true concepts that mature later, but their 
psychological nature, constituents, structure and mode of activity differ 
significantly from those of true concepts. He saw the development of 
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conceptual thinking as being a function of socio-cultural development, 
where tasks posed for the maturing adolescent by the social 
environment are an essential factor. If the environment does not pose 
the tasks, advance new demands, or stimulate the development of the 
intellect through new goals, the adolescent's thinking does not develop 
all its inherent potentialities. Two interesting notions would be to 
investigate the way different societies and cultures challenge their 
adolescents and to investigate whether different cultures have different 
theories of mind. 
Piaget did not attribute children with a theory of mind until they were 
in the formal operational stage of adolescence. He described this stage 
as one of scientific thought which developed through the emergence of 
concepts like beliefs, desires, thoughts and fantasies, none of which 
emerged at an earlier stage. Before this he believed that there were 
planes within knowledge of action and conceptualization. Children do 
not think beyond actions; classification and conceptualization occur later 
(Briguier, 1980). 
Fabricius and Schwanenflugel ( 1994) cite findings that suggest that 
older children are engaged in an extended process of developing a 
constructivist theory of mind. Mental activities can vary along a 
representational continuum. At the one end are activities that involve 
very little interpretation, organization and transformation of 
information. At the other end are those that involve extensive 
interpretation, organization and transformation. Fabricius and 
Schwanenflugel have found that eight year olds have a 
nonconstructivist theory of mind, where they categorize activities on 
the basis of seeing and hearing or outcomes, rather than mental 
processes. Six year olds have an information processing view, while ten 
year olds also categorize information on the basis of seeing and hearing 
rather than mental processes. Children of these ages also do not employ 
a constructivist theory of mind. It is only when children come to see 
that acquisition of information is influenced by mental processes that 
they are on the verge of a constructivist understanding of the mental 
processes. Young children do know that the same information can give 
rise to different outcomes. What changes is their understanding of how 
different outcomes are possible. Only around eleven years of age does 
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thought acquire a proper experimental orientation to answering 
questions regarding causal relations. A personal epistemology regarding 
the structure of the world only develops in late adolescence. 
Chandler (1988) sees adolescence as the period in which a constructivist 
epistemology develops. Adolescents understand that interpretive 
differences that separate people are endemic to the knowing process 
itself. Doubts occur on a wide scale and question the trustworthiness of 
all knowledge. This can threaten the whole epistemic process and may 
leave no belief unturned. The shift from a realistic to a more 
constructivist epistemology introduces the notion of relativity of 
knowledge and the amibiguity of interpretation. Chandler regards this 
new theory of mind as the bridge between subjective experience and 
objective truth. A concern with this shift would open up a whole new 
area for theory of mind researchers who have previously only focussed 
on preschoolers. 
Despite Deanna Kuhn's (1989) empiricist conception of science, she 
describes development as a continuum where at one end, the 
nondiff erentiation of theory and evidence occurs. At this end she places 
young children and some adults. At the other end _is the full 
differentiation and co-ordination of theory and evidence that is under 
conscious control. This is the domain of professional scientists. She sees 
the ability to co-ordinate theories and evidence as being dependent on a 
mastery of reasoning skills which develop with age, and she concludes 
that some adults never manage to get very far along the continuum. 
There has been very little effort directed towards older children's 
understanding of mind, as the preoccupation is towards finding lower 
and lower threshholds of competence with younger and younger 
children. Research is needed to investigate how competence structures 
become generalized across different domains. In the following chapter 
narrative writing is suggested as a suitable methodology for research 
with adolescents. 
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SECTION C: ASSESSING CHILDREN'S KNOWLEDGE 
2. 7. The Knowing Child 
Much developmental research is aimed at assessing children's 
knowledge or understanding of objects, events or concepts. Because no 
one has direct access to the thoughts and meanings of others, the child 
has to rely on communication to find out what others think, know and 
believe, but also to share mental states and experiences with others 
(Brown and Dunn, 1991). Many researchers believe that they can tap 
into this understanding through eliciting verbal responses from children 
in answer to investigators' probes. This is based on a view of science 
which collapses all levels of epistemic states into one; it fails to 
appreciate that there might be different types of knowledge. The 
research also ignores the problems that exist for the child in 
communicating their knowledge or understanding to a stranger, often 
about situations which are outside of their everyday experience. 
Vygotsky ( 1962) saw the distinction between different types of 
knowing as crucial in preschool children. He used the examples of 
learning one's mother tongue and a foreign language to draw the 
distinction. He took learning one's mother tongue as an example of 
spontaneous knowledge. This is knowledge that is neither conscious nor 
organized; one has it and uses it without being aware of doing so. It 
would seem to be equated to the lower biological functions. Learning a 
foreign language he equated with the concept of scientific knowledge, 
the acquisition of which is conscious, organized and voluntary. This he 
saw as developing once the child was at school, where it was founded on 
the basis of spontaneous knowledge. Again this appears to follow the 
development of a higher psychological function, which is dependent on 
it's biological substratum yet becomes realized and supercedes it 
through social relations. With this distinction between different types of 
knowledge in mind, it may be that theory of mind researchers are 
investigating young children who are still at the stage of Vygotsky's 
spontaneous knowledge. They lack awareness of this knowledge yet are 
able to use it correctly. While they lack conscious awareness and 
organization, they use the knowledge intuitively. If a child is asked to 
reflect on this knowledge, they might not be able to give a considered 
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response. Children's practical knowledge is well established before they 
are able to answer reflective questions on the topic (Dunn, 1991). 
Wertsch ( 1985) claims that asking children why they are doing things is 
like asking fish about water. First you need to explain what water is and 
remind the fish that it is there. What the fish then has to say about 
water may be interesting, but it has as much to do with your question 
and its setup as it does with the fish's experience with water. 
Biggs ( 199 2) distinguishes between different types of knowledge: 1) 
Tacit knowledge which is manifested by doing and is usually not 
verbally accessible; 2) Intuitive knowledge that is directly perceived or 
felt; 3) Declarative knowledge which is expressed through the medium 
of a symbol system which is publicly understandable; 4) Theoretical 
knowledge which is at a higher level of abstraction; 5) Meta theoretical 
knowledge which goes beyond the bounds of conventional theory to 
where paradigms may be shifted; 6) Procedural knowledge which refers 
to knowing how like tacit knowledge, but it is not necessarily 
unverbalized; and 7) Conditional knowledge which provides support for 
procedural knowledge: knowing how and why. Forms of knowledge 
from one to five are hierarchical, thus declarative knowledge has its 
roots in tacit and intuitive knowledge. The implications of this for 
developmental theory have been ignored, as is seen in the false belief 
tests, when children are asked what they know. Children are forced to 
focus on the logical and declarative, rather than the intuitive and 
procedural. 
According to Bidell and Fischer ( 1992) most contemporary cognitive 
developmental theorists accept the principle of domain specificity. 
According to this theory, knowledge is not organised in unitary 
structures that cut across all types of tasks and situations. It is 
organized within specific domains defined by particular contents or 
tasks such as music or spatial properties. The recognition that 
knowledge does not have to be organized in single unitary structures is 
a first step in moving away from context neutral conceptions of 
cognition. However despite the recognition of domain specificity, 
cognitive abilities continue to be portrayed in ways that separate 
context specific performance from organismic cognitive structures. 
Cognitive structures are seen as the product of a developmental process 
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that is somehow independent of learning. Development is thought to 
supply the general structures of knowledge, while learning has the task 
of filling up these preformed structures with educational content. There 
is an artificial division of structure from content. A cognitive 
developmental theory should describe the ways that cognitive 
organisation is constructed in the context of everyday activity. This calls 
for a new conception of cognitive abilities, not as abstract structures, 
but as context-specific organisations of thought and action. 
Bidell and Fischer recommend the skill theory, which describes the 
acquisition of knowledge in terms of the construction of specific, context 
embedded skills rather than the general equilibrium of cross-contextual 
logical structures. An individual's level of cognitive ability in a given 
task or situation is not rigidly determined by a pre-established logical 
system, but is highly flexible and differs according to the degree of 
social support afforded by a given context. The developmental range 
(Kitchener and Fischer, 1990) describes the range of developmental 
levels an individual can exhibit on a given task across a variety of 
contexts. Vygotsky (1978) drew attention to this phenomenon with his 
zone of proximal development. This ref erred to a range of levels of 
ability an individual could achieve under differing conditions of social 
support. Vygotsky saw development taking place with the support of 
the social environment; thus, when the support varies, the level of 
children's performance varies through a zone or range. Thus the level of 
a skill is context dependent. The developmental range thus provides a 
tool for examining how environmental support affects cognitive 
development. Skills are constructed in one context and have to be 
generalized through reconstruction to other contexts. Fischer and Bidell 
suggest that the course of cognitive development be construed as a web 
rather than a hierarchical ladder, as its variety of potential starting 
points and multiple developmental pathways leading to different 
outcomes, lend themselves to this description. 
A crucial distinction needs to be made in theory of mind methodology 
between what a child knows and what they think. A broader approach 
is needed which allows one to assess all areas of the child's mental 
functioning. There will always be a surface manifestation of what seems 
to be going on in human activity and an alternative interpretation to 
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what something means (Vygotsky, 1987). There is an assumption that 
thought and speech are identical functions, and along similar lines to 
Chandler's competence-performance relation, it is assumed that what a 
child says (their performance) is a true indication of what they are 
thinking (their competence). Vygotsky divided language into thought 
and speech as two independent streams, with thought not immediately 
coinciding with verbal expression. He saw thought not as consisting of 
individual words, but being greater in extent and volume than these. 
The transition from thought to speech he saw as an extremely complex 
process that involved the partitioning of thought and its recreation in 
words. Thus a direct transition from thought to word was impossible. 
His unit of analysis was 'word meaning,' which presupposed social 
interaction and generalization on the grounds that understanding can 
only occur when one can relate one's experience to a specific class of 
experiences that are known to the other person. On this view, to 
understand what someone thought about something, one would have to 
grapple with the concept of word meaning. Merely looking to the child's 
speech would ignore the context in which the social interaction took 
place as well as the influence of the generalisation. According to 
Vygotsky the meaning of a word develops long after the word has 
acquired a stable referent, for it is constantly being redefined at 
different ages. If one wanted to understand a child's thinking or 
cognitive development, using a technique that relied solely on linguistic 
responses would be an inadequate measure according to Vygotsky. 
Consistent with Chandler's argument, then, one cannot predict the 
child's thought or stage of cognitive competence from their utterances 
or performances. 
Valsiner ( 1992) describes the development of knowledge through 
internalisation and externalisation processes. Initially, social 
experiences are taken into the intrapsychological cognitive-affective 
system of the self and restructured according to the previous structure 
of that self. The transformational nature of the internalisation process 
guarantees its transformation into a novel form. The 'social others' 
participate in constructing a constraining framework that guides the 
internalisation process. This transformation invokes Vygotsky's (1978) 
zone of proximal development, which involves the child's gradual 
internalisation of interactions between two people, one an adult or an 
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accomplished peer. As the child becomes adult, they become able to 
control the structures individually without scaffolding or assistance 
from the older person. Thus, the zone gradually decreases or even 
disappears with age. On the other hand, the contrary notion of 
developmental range grows larger with age. 
The externalisation of this internal knowledge is similar to the 
internalisation process in possessing a transformative as opposed to a 
passive nature. Externalization involves constructive transformation of 
the internalised psychological phemonena into the interpersonal 
domain. Thus empirical research on cognitive development that looks 
only at the outcomes of the externalisation process is unable to infer 
anything about the true underlying process. The study of the 
externalisation process itself, the ways in which the internal becomes 
transformed into the externally available product, may replace the 
impasse reached when inferring mental representations from the 
outcomes of externalisation. Rogoff (1993) uses the term 'participatory 
appropriation' for internalisation, as she feels that internalisation 
implies a separation between the person and the social context. She uses 
appropriation to refer to the change that results from a person's own 
participation in an activity. Meacham ( 199 3) likewise talks of 
externalising cognition into the environment, a process which sees 
cognition as development within a framework of interpersonal relations 
rather than as an attribute located within the mind of individual people. 
Karmiloff-Smith ( 199 2) sees the linguistic system as being domain 
general and becoming domain specific and modularized over the course 
of learning. Linguistic representations that are built up in infancy and 
early childhood serve as a means of comprehending and producing the 
native tongue. They are not however available as data for metalinguistic 
comprehension as they are information in the mind, not yet knowledge 
to the mind. The knowledge that is embedded implicitly in linguistic 
procedures has to be re-represented before it can be treated as data 
and ultimately as metalinguistic reflection. In the developmental 
literature when children cannot report on some aspect of their 
cognition, it is often implied that the knowledge is absent. Karmiloff-
Smith' s modularity model postulates that knowledge is represented 
internally, but is still in a format that is inaccessible to verbal report. 
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Before the child can become a potential linguist, his or her 
representations have to undergo multiple levels of redescription. Thus 
Karmiloff-Smith's model proposes a process of knowledge development 
similar to Piaget's with more mature models developing at a later stage. 
Piaget's constuctivism holds that knowledge of the world emerges via a 
process of creative invention. It is not a product of discovering ideas in 
a rationalist sense, nor of learning in the empiricist sense, but of 
literally creation by infants as experience interacts with their biological 
predisposition. This creative invention is only constrained by the 
physical laws of the environment and the biological possibilities of the 
child (Brainerd, 1996). 
It is interesting to trace Vygotsky's and Piaget's different views on the 
development of thought, as false belief tests seem to rest on the 
linguistic abilities of children at the age at which language ability is 
differentiating and expanding. Piaget saw the history of the child's 
thought as a gradual socialization of autistic characteristics that define 
the child's mind. Social thought lay at the end of the developmental 
process. Chapman ( 1991) claims that Piaget did not dispute that 
language was social from the beginning, but believed that language and 
thought became more social during the preschool years as children 
came better at being able to understand, represent and anticipate 
others' views. Piaget (1962b) viewed children's thinking as being 
egocentric, a transitional stage between autistic and rational thought 
which he nevertheless believed was social. He viewed egocentric speech 
as having no useful function in the child's behaviour and it was an 
expression of the child's dream and would disappear over time. 
Vygotsky refuted this claim, believing that the first forms of intellectual 
life are practical, reality-directed thinking. He described children's 
thinking as operating on what surrounded the child. 
Vygotsky saw the first form of speech as being social, after which it 
differentiates into egocentric and communicative speech. Both of these 
latter are equally social, but with different functions. Inner speech, 
then, develops from the social with egocentric speech being the 
transition. Vygotsky believed that egocentric speech occurred when the 
child encountered difficulties in automatic activities and he viewed it as 
the attempt to make sense of the situation in words. This occurred with 
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older children in the form of soundless, inner speech. Piaget did not 
dwell on the development of inner speech as he believed that egocentric 
speech disappeared. Vygotsky maintained that egocentric speech is 
transformed into inner speech. His distinction between thought and 
speech allowed for the fact that, while a child might use egocentric 
speech, that does not mean that his or her thought is egocentric. It may 
instead function as a component of realistic thinking with the logic of 
goal directed action and thinking. The age around which these notions of 
egocentric speech seem to fall is similar to when the false belief test 
scenario is tested on children. It is difficult to know how this changing 
speech function may affect linguistic responses that a child gives. 
Piaget (1954, 1973) believed that language was necessary although not 
sufficient for operational thinking, as without it operations would not be 
able to be regulated by interpersonal exchange and cooperation. 
Operations would remain actions without being integrated into systems 
of simultaneous transformations. Gal'perin's ( 1969) theory of the 
development of mental acts suggests that the phenomenon of egocentric 
speech and the interiorization of action are intimately connected, 
although Piaget considered them to be separate. Gal 'perin believed that 
while actions may be represented in mental imagery, they remain 
dependent on their material context. They are only freed from this by 
an intermediate step of being represented in audible, self-directed 
speech. As this self-directed speech becomes internalized, these 
semiotically represented actions become fully interiorized. 
While Vygotsky saw cognitive growth as developing from the social to 
the individual plane, and Piaget from the individual to the social, both 
placed a dialectical emphasis on the interaction between society and the 
individual. Both are constructivist in stressing that the action of the 
subject gives rise to knowledge. Piaget gives the subject primacy, 
whereas Vygotsky gives it to the social environment. Both regard 
language as the mediator of reality and the important instrument for 
self regulation of behaviour. They both seem to represent opposite poles 
in dialectical theories of the relationship between the individual and 
society. There cannot be knowledge in an individual unless, and until, 
that individual is in a sense social and unless that knowledge includes 
knowledge that is social (Butterworth and Light, 1982). 
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2. 8. Reporting Adults' Interviews with Children 
It is extremely difficult to tell whether or not children are exercising an 
ability they possess. Likewise the reliance of the false belief tests on the 
child's linguistic responses to a hypothetical situation is problematic. 
The fact that a child might understand something, but might not have 
the competency to convey that understanding, is taken to mean that 
they do not have the cognitive ability. A linguistic response to an 
investigator's question is not an adequate measure for understanding a 
mental state. Human action is mediated by language and, because of 
this, it is subject to multiple interpretations. This then places a priority 
on the context in which the activity is occurring. Examining a child's 
verbal responses only accesses one area of understanding. From a 
Vygotskian perspective, this approach proceeds the wrong way round. 
It assumes that the verbal responses will reveal what it is that is 
hidden inside the mind, whereas according to Vygotsky, what is inside 
only has meaning in terms of the external context. Vygotsky did not 
accept the separation of mind and society. 
Hatch (1995) describes children's interviews with adults as being 
speech events that end up having very closed rules with little true 
conversation. This points to the idea that the rules determine the game: 
a traditional laboratory-type situation immediately restricts a scenario 
to what variables a researcher is going to allow to occur and which 
responses he or she is looking for. Information presented is 
predetermined and is often used to try to elicit specific responses; or an 
either/ or scenario. This is in line with the hypothetico-deductive 
method of doing research, which aims to confirm or refute a specific 
hypothesis. Experimenters are often only interested in a particular 
aspect of a subject's behaviour and so ask questions with this in mind as 
opposed to a general instruction of the subject to tell all. Subjects are 
frequently given a limited set of alternatives which need to be directly 
related to the representations that they have in mind. The hypothetico-
deductive method is an extremely limited and restrictive approach to 
scientific discovery and understanding. 
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Behaviourists have traditionally been wary of treating verbal reports as 
data, although verbal responses have provided basic behavioural data 
in standard experimental designs. There has been uncertainty as how to 
treat the verbalizations of a subject as they find their way towards a 
solution or a response. These have been classified, along with the 
subject's responses to experimenter's questions, as being a part of the 
introspective process which most behaviourists reject as impossible to 
verify. Chapman ( 1991) claims that asking a child "How do you know?" 
implies a justification of a judgement and does not occasion an 
introspective report on its psychological antecedents. He argues that 
children's explanations of their own judgements on reasoning tasks 
should be considered as attempts at justification, not as introspective 
reports on their own cognitive processes. Their justifications are of 
theoretical interest in themselves, not just clues to processes by which 
their judgements were obtained. The relation between their 
justifications and their prior cognitive processes is an important 
theoretical and empirical problem, not an a priori given. 
The children's reports are given in response to an experimenter's probe 
or question, and the influence of this probe on the child needs to be 
assessed. White ( 19 8 8) argues that a question may mean different 
things to an experimenter and a subject, particularly when it involves a 
child. Subjects respond according to their interpretation and not that of 
the experimenter. While a child may use the same word as an 
experimenter, it is not clear that the meaning of this word is the same 
for the child as for the experimenter. The complexity of the false belief 
scenario should prompt researchers to be highly cautious when 
assessing the verbalisations of children. Their concept of the false belief 
test would require checking as to whether it was different from the 
experimenter, particularly as the misrepresented scenario is likely to be 
outside of their experience. 
Nisbett and Wilson ( 1977) claim that the accuracy of subjective verbal 
reports is generally so poor as to suggest that any introspective access 
that may exist is not sufficient to produce generally reliable or correct 
reports. White ( 1980) claims that the relationship between 
introspective access and veral report accuracy is a cultural theory, 
based on a hypothetical entity called the self and the remainder of 
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mental activity. In this theory, consciousness is a faculty possessed by 
the self and which mediates between the self and the remainder of 
mental activity. White argues that propositions about consciousness 
carry no implications for verbal report accuracy and propositions about 
verbal report accuracy carry no implications for consciousness. He 
claims that any attempt to test a hypothesis about introspective access 
which uses verbal report content or accuracy as a dependent measure 
requires an assumption about the relationship betwen the two. If an 
assumption about this relationship cannot be validated, then there is 
little prospect for using verbal reports to test hypotheses about 
introspectice access. No one has ever succeeded in putting to the test 
any hypothesis about consciousness (White, 1980). McClure (1980) 
argues that Nisbett and Wilson base their approach on a positivistic 
conception of causes of behaviour in which the subject is depicted as a 
passive mediator. Traditional laboratory methods take no account of the 
active nature of the subject, nor of the causal structures that reside in 
the subject. They likewise fail to take into account all those processes 
that are internal to the subject, suggesting that the subject has no 
knowledge of what occurs between presentation of the stimulus and 
their response. 
The giving of a verbal self report is a social act and to understand it we 
have to understand the subject's involvement in the social context in 
which it is given. People will aspire to accuracy in verbal reports only 
to the extent that it serves their practical concerns. There may be other 
practical considerations that may carry more weight than the need for 
accuracy. Excusing an action or gaining approval or power or avoiding 
attention may all be more important needs to the subject than accuracy. 
Children particularly may want to please the experimenter and give 
them what they figure the experimenter desires. Retrospective causal 
reports may be accurate, but high accuracy is not sufficient to infer that 
internally available information about events between the stimulus and 
the response was the reason for accuracy. Differences in conversational 
experience are reflected in differences in performance between older 
and younger children. Older children are better able to recognise the 
scientific purpose of an experimenter's question as they often know 
how to set aside quantity, quality and relevance rules in a conversation, 
and have more conversational scripts. 
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According to Ericsson and Simon ( 19 80) retrospective reports are 
dependent on short term memory. If short term memory capacity is 
exceeded, information can be transferred to long term memory, but it 
may not be retrieved when the report is made. If the subject is asked 
for information immediately after performing the task, it is likely that 
most of the information will still be in short term memory which will 
allow direct reporting of the process and facilitate retrieval from long 
term memory for episodic associations. The operating characteristics of 
memory may have complex effects. For instance, the suffix effect 
hypothesis needs to be ruled out (Baddeley, 1976). A suffix impairs 
memory for most recent events, but leaves memory for earlier events 
intact. Any response to the process by the subject has the effect of a 
suffix. The consequence of this response is that memory for internal 
events immediately antecedent to it is destroyed. This hypothesis 
predicts inaccurate retrospective verbal reports until the suffix effect is 
ruled out. In false belief tests where young children are asked where 
they had first thought Maxi to be, effects of memory and retrieval may 
play a confounding role, as they frequently get this wrong. 
Ericsson and Simon (1980) warn of instructions that require a visual 
scene to be described verbally, for requiring a verbal recoding of a 
picture requires extensive processing. This is likely to slow down 
processing, change the structure and course of the performance and 
may influence both what is remembered and what is later available to 
retrospective verbalization. The magnitude of the effects depends on 
how difficult it is to describe the visual scene in words. A number of 
studies have shown that different people show preferences for 
perceptual versus verbal processing. Requiring subjects to verbalize 
explanations in a task with complex visual stimuli would cause those 
with a preference for perceptual processing to alter their strategies and 
likewise their performance. The visual scenes that false belief tests 
encapsulate are reasonably complex as the child has to visualize two 
scenarios as well as make a prediction. When subjects are under a high 
cognitive load, it has been found that they stop verbalizing or do so 
incompletely. Furthermore information that has been stored in short 
term memory can be easily obliterated. 
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White (1980) suggests that the making of a judgement and the report 
should both be things that are easy for the subject to do. The task 
should not require concentration and effort by the subject when trying 
to comprehend difficult situations or instructions. False belief tests are 
extremely complex for they postulate hypothetical situations which are 
outside of the child's experience and then ask them to form a 
judgement. Manipulation in an experiment completely redefines the 
situation which has an unpredictable effect. Manipulation in the false 
belief tests can redefine the situation for the child without the 
experimenter being aware of it's effects. According to Donaldson (1978) 
a child's interpretation of what we say to them is influenced by their 
knowledge of the language, their assessment of what we intend, our 
nonlinguistic behaviour and the manner in which they represent the 
situation to themselves. 
Ericsson and Simon (1980) however propose that verbal reports are 
data and accounting for them requires explication of the mechanisms by 
which they are generated and the ways in which they are sensitive to 
experimental factors. They caution that verbal reports need to be 
elicited with care and interpreted in the light of how they were 
obtained. They see the need for the development of a theory of the 
response mechanism, a theoretical framework that can provide a model 
for the verbalization process. At present the only common feature 
among different techniques to obtain data is that the subject reponds 
verbally to a question or instruction of the experimenter. The evidence 
that the subject has reached a solution is that they are able to report it. 
The relation of the report to the outcome of the process is never 
questioned. 
The above-mentioned difficulties with verbal reports suggest that while 
they play a valuable role in getting information from the child, as in the 
case of theory of mind research, they should not be the sole or major 
source of information. They should be one of many sources of 
information as to how the child understands their own mental states 
and those of others. 
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2. 9. Children's Knowledge of Self and of Others 
An area of particular interest in theory of mind research is the relation 
between the development of self knowledge and the development of 
knowledge about other people. The question is whether we experience 
our own psychological states directly and then use this information of 
our self to simulate the psychological experiences of others, or whether 
knowledge about the self has to be inf erred the same way as knowledge 
about other people. The reason for describing different views on this 
subject is to reveal how one's view of science determines whether one 
accepts that children's understanding can be described as a theory. 
Morton's (1980) "theory-theory" holds that our knowledge of the 
mental world is a theory, where understanding of the self and others 
develop together as children acquire a theory of mind ( Gopnik, 199 3; 
Gopnik and Wellman,1992). Proponents of the theory-theory argue that 
children's knowledge of the mind is like an organised causal-
explanatory system with the defining characteristics of theories; 
children's understanding of the mind is a coherent body of abstract 
theoretical constructs that are used to explain and predict behaviour. 
The theory-theory claims that the process that underlies the discovery 
of one's own psychological states does not differ from that which 
underlies the discovery of the psychological states of others; knowledge 
about the self and others develop in parallel. Limitations in 
understanding of other people's mental states will be reflected in the 
same limitations in understanding of one's own mental states. 
Gopnik and Astington (1988) have supported this view by comparing 
research on young children's ability to report their own former false 
beliefs with their ability to answer questions about current false beliefs 
of other people. They claim further that if knowledge about one's own 
mental states has to be inferred rather than directly perceived, the 
chance of error occurring is far greater. On this view there is no reason 
to expect young children's reports about their own mental states to be 
accurate. Gopnik ( 1993) describes the alternative belief that people 
have direct reliable experience of their own psychological states as an 
illusion. 
('. -) \ . 
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Wellman has been very influential in theory of mind research with his 
exposition of our understanding of mental states as theories. The view 
of theory that is commonly held in theory of mind research has been 
strongly influenced by Wellman's ( 1990) analysis. He classifies theory 
into two different types: everyday theory and scientific theory and 
further divides scientific theory into framework and specific theories. A 
framework theory is not dependent on empirical data and the formation 
and revision of such a theory does not require scientific theorizing. This 
type of theory defines the domains and processes within it. Specific 
theories advance the detailed explanations of phenomena within the 
domains of the framework theory. Specific theories are accountable to 
data, which in turn are dependent on global theories. Wellman suggests 
that a theory of mind be regarded as a framework theory, which 
defines the ontological domain and explanatory causal framework 
within which specific theories can be developed. 
Wellman claims that young children's theories are acquired through 
everyday knowledge acquisition in childhood, and rely on the 
distinction between internal, mental states and external, physical and 
behavioural phenomena. Wellman proffers three criteria that a theory 
must meet. The first is that they are characterised by coherence. 
Theories are not a string of facts, but their meaning is enhanced through 
their interconnectedness in the structure. The second criterion is that 
they must display ontological distinctiveness, which is demonstrated 
through the separation of the world into two categories; the internal, 
mental realm and the external physical realm. The third criterion is that 
they provide us with explanatory causal frameworks with respect to the 
domain under investigation. 
Wellman and Estes ( 1986) found that three year olds do not display a 
tendency to interpret mental entities as physical and real. Instead they 
found that children were clearly able to distinguish between mental and 
physical entities. They understood that mental entities represented a 
referent; a memory of a dog was not a dog, but was taken to represent 
it. Wellman claims that children consistently transform mental images, 
while understanding that they cannot be seen or touched in a way that 
real objects are. He claims that, although young children are not aware 
of their theories, they still use them. Their theories are not the products 
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of scientific theorizing as they do not test their theories by seeking 
confirming data. Wellman ( 1991) argues that, with their theory of mind, 
children are able to understand their own and others' mental states. 
This causal aspect of mind depicts human actions as the joint product of 
the actor's beliefs and desires. If children know the actor's beliefs and 
desires, they should be able to predict their behaviour. Likewise, if they 
are given an action to explain, they should be able to do so by appealing 
to beliefs and desires. Feldman ( 1992) describes Wellman's claim that 
three year olds have a theory of mind as having a positivist feeling, in 
that once it is acquired it allows the child to predict, just as in 
Skinnerian behaviourism. He believes that our knowledge of human 
intentions is more interpretive than predictive. It allows us to interpret 
what meaning an action may have and even to infer about others, states 
of mind that are not seen in action. It does not let us predict behaviours 
from mental states the way we predict animals will behave. 
Astington and Gopnik ( 1991) claim that the theory formation view has 
been most productive in generating interesting empirical predictions 
and in explaining phenomena. They query whether it is at all possible to 
accelerate children's development at particular crucial times, for 
example, around the age of three to four. This reveals a view that 
ignores contextual influences on development. It belongs to the modular 
view which sees structures as being encased within the child and 
something that can be exposed through experimenter manipulation. It 
gives no credence to the child as an active mediator of those structures 
through use of their language and actions. The theory view also seems 
to place great store on the predictive value of theories as opposed to 
their explanatory worth. Astington and Gopnik claim that their view of 
theories provides explanation of phenomena, but it would seem to be 
more of a deductively derived than abductively generated explanation. 
Simulation theory contradicts the position of the theory-theory. 
Goldman ( 199 3) believes that psychological beliefs are not dependent 
on a theory of the mind. Rather, they are the consequence of having a 
particular type of mind - one which allows psychological experiences to 
occur. This view postulates that children directly experience their own 
mental states and use knowledge of their own minds as the basis for 
making inferences about the mental states of others (Harris,1991). 
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Children imagine themselves as being in the other person's situation 
and then take intentions and thoughts they would experience as 
corresponding to the actual psychological states of the other person. 
Wellman believes that the simulation and theory views are compatible 
in that children do have a wealth of observational-experiential data, but 
he claims that their understanding of that data can be theory-like. He 
claims that to understand these experiences children develop a 
framework by organizing their experiences so that they can simulate 
others' desires instead of having to cope with a stream of consciousness. 
There is another view that children's understanding of the mind is not 
based on knowledge, but on a set of social and cultural practices and 
conventions - a form of life where the developmental mechanism is 
considered to be socialization (Butterworth, 1991). Butterworth ( 1994) 
likewise does not see the mind as a theoretical entity but something 
that can be directly perceived in behaviour. He states that children 
should not be regarded as folk psychologists but rather as people in a 
social world. Theorising is not the ultimate source of knowledge about 
the mind as information about mental events is available in social 
relationships. In real life minds are situated in bodies and mental 
events manifest in social behaviour. 
Carl Johnson ( 19 8 8) proposes that young children's understanding of 
the mind is not theory-like, but is the experience of the mind. He uses 
Vygotsky's distinction between young children and scholars. For 
children knowledge is initially intuitive and develops into something 
that is constructed. He claims that when young children are asked about 
mental phenomena, they answer by reporting from an organised 
structure of their own conscious experience, without the benefit of 
constructs or beliefs. They read off their own state of mind when they 
project themselves into another's position. This knowledge is therefore 
limited by their ability to imagine or simulate states of people in the 
world. 
Hobson ( 1991) argues that children acquire knowledge of people with 
minds through experience of affectively charged interpersonal relations. 
This too is a Vygotskian notion. On this view children's understanding of 
people arises in a context of interpersonal relations. This understanding 
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is based on the innateness of our perceptions and involves relating to 
bodies of others with co-ordinated patterns of action and feeling. 
Hobson claims that mature experience presents itself as an immediate 
consciousness of the existence of things outside the mind. He sees the 
fact that people have minds as being no different from any other fact. 
Likewise, he questions why inference has to imply theorizing and asks 
precisely what aspects of mind are theoretically understood. He claims 
that we do not first perceive non-personal bodies and impute mental 
states at a relatively late stage; we do not infer that others have mental 
states. It is as true that persons have minds, as they have bodies, and 
the preconditions for coming to know this is the case include innate 
capacities for perceptually anchored personal relatedness. The structure 
of first person phenomenological experience provides a non-theoretical 
aspect to our awareness of the nature of mental life. Hobson maintains 
that because we infer things, this does not amount to theorizing. Our 
understanding of the mind is only partially theoretical in nature. He 
believes that it is only through the experience of personal relations that 
children can come to acquire a concept of persons with minds. 
Biologically determined biases and preconceptions are those that 
promote and reflect personal relatedness and it is through these that an 
infant establishes the basic ontological distinction between persons and 
things. 
Hobson maintains that at no point in early development does anything 
like the use of a theory enter the picture. Children in their second year 
have a non-theorylike understanding of people with their own 
subjective orientations towards the world. To have and to apply a 
theory, one must already know what it is to theorize and so one must 
already have a concept of one's own theory-holding mind. Hobson 
maintains that awareness of other minds is a precondition for acquiring 
reflective self-awareness. To be able to adopt a psychological 
orientation to one's own mental states, one needs to appreciate 
alternative points of view. This is congruent with Vygotsky's notion of 
the primary role of the social context in psychological functioning. 
Children's understanding of the representational mind is acquired by 
way of earlier understanding that people have differing subjective 
orientations and attitudes to given objects and perceived events out 
there. Hobson criticizes Wellman for not differentiating between 
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knowledge and theory. Whilst both concepts provide underlying 
principles for conceptual organization, knowledge has to be true, 
whereas the same does not hold for a theory. 
Hobson claims that the notion of theory leads us to underestimate the 
degree to which a child perceives and knows about other minds. He 
claims that we need public criteria according to which mental states can 
be judged. Research at present only uses language questioning with 
young children. He criticizes the possible treatment of mental states as 
being theoretically equal in nature, when there is great diversity in 
their nature and in the way they are understood. The theory of mind 
child theorist is portrayed as isolated and exclusively cognitivist 
creature. Hobson sees a problem with how the child knows the relation 
between others' representations and their actions, how the subjective 
aspects of mental life are linked to the outside world. The 
developmental progression is from an infant's perception and growing 
understanding of the public, psychologically expressive behaviour and 
attitudes of persons to a young child's more sophisticated knowledge of 
the nature of persons and their potentially, but only partially, 
undisclosed minds. 
Hobson's differentiation of theory and knowledge calls to mind one's 
view of the nature of science. According to the logical positivist view, 
theory is a fixed knowledge structure with the role of organizing and 
ordering observations. The realist view is that theories are primarily 
explanatory tools which aim to understand the structures that lie 
behind and explain phenomena. They the ref ore have a role that lies 
beneath the empiricist surface level and have a scope that is often more 
global than positivist empiricism. Perner (1991) claims that knowledge 
is not an internal state, but denotes an internal state as that state 
relates to the external world. If one takes up the realist account of 
science, one needs to consider whether the theory that the child is 
deemed to have functions primarily as an explanatory tool. Wellman's 
view seems to be more that the theory is a tool for predicting behaviour 
from beliefs and desires than an explanatory tool. Thus his view has 
more of an empiricist ring to it, a view which is unacceptable to the 
realist view of science. Perner ( 1991) believes that to have a theory of 
something one has to have a deep explanation for how that something 
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works. Using mental terminology in causal statements is not enough for 
a set of beliefs to be called a theory of mind, for there is no explanation 
yet for how and why these mental states do their jobs. Dispositional 
explanations are of this nature, having little conceptual depth. Some 
realists would provisionally accept these explanations with the 
expectation that they be developed into more fully fledged explanations 
at a later stage. In the same way that there are different legitimate 
epistemic states of knowing, so are there different legitimate states of 
explanation. 
SECTION D: MOTIVATION OF ASSESSMENTS WITH CHILDREN 
Meacham ( 1991) believes that controversies surrounding the 
competencies of children will not be settled by looking at the techniques 
and tools of assessment nor at an idealized notion of competence. He 
believes that the controversy needs contextualizing through examining 
the situations in which it arises and the motivations of all parties. 
Whose interests are being served by the assessments and the 
interpretations given to children's competencies, as well as what type of 
assessment is involved, are all issues that need addressing. A crucial 
issue centres on what the type of assessment implies for the 
relationships between children and their teachers, parents, caregivers 
and public officials. Criteria for assessing children's competencies do not/ 
arise in a vacuum, but arise when someone wishes to take action toward 
children, and as a prerequisite, attempts to assess their abilities and 
then interpret those assessments. Meacham suggests that claims that 
such assessments objectively capture a child's competence and are thus 
a guide to future action, are an illusion. The results of the asessments 
are given meaning as a function of the context in which the need for 
them and desire for action arose. Burman ( 1996) warns how 
psychology's research methods can make psychologists complicit in 
constructing and maintaining hierarchies of power, inequality and 
oppressive practices. 
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2. 10. The Interest in The Mind 
Kessen (1979) claims that the commitment of science to technology is 
tied in with traditional scientific notions of prediction and control. These 
are values that technology appears to require and to which empiricist 
science is able to contribute. Problems like antisocial behaviour, drug 
abuse and unemployment are scientifically related to childhood 
experiences. Solutions are suggested in terms of behavioural 
technological interventions, education programmes or therapies. The 
assumed primacy of expert over lay knowledge is found in descriptions 
of appropriate parenting styles for working mothers, parents 
experiencing divorce, and so on. 
The technological milieu has been responsible for the credibility given 
to research on the mind. Ferner ( 1991) suggestively comments that it is 
the possibility of being able to simulate the mind and its workings that 
has given credibility to research in this area. The resources that are 
being put into research programmes in artificial intelligence provide 
support for this claim. Once again the main aim seems to be the control 
and prediction of behaviour. Whilst explanatory forces are a 
consideration, they basically serve to enhance the main focus, which is 
prediction and control. The fact that researchers have approached the 
mind from the perspective of the child's own understanding, is based on/:i 
the belief that more complex adult behaviours are an additive result of/( 
simple behaviours. The fact that the child's understanding and 
functioning might be entirely different from an adult's, seems to have 
been ignored, along with the associated views of Piagetian 
developmental psychology, The current view seems to be motivated by 
the belief that if one can understand the functioning of the child's mind, 
perhaps this simpler functioning might help in computer simulations of 
the adult mind. Once again the commitment to technological science 
with its emphasis on prediction and control is manifest. 
The fact that mind is now an acceptable area for research has little to do 
with a resolution of the mind-body problem. Cognitive scientists have 
merely taken up the mind as a phenomenon to be studied, much as 
behaviourism took up behaviour. Some believe that the computational, 
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information-processing approach that dominates cognitive psychology 
will solve the nature of the relation between mind and body. The mind 
will have been shown to be a vastly complicated system of 
computational devices that are embodied in the brain. The relation of 
the mind to the brain will be of a computer programme driving a 
computer to the electronic hardware of the computer being driven. 
Schwartz (1980) describes the underlying proposals in cognitive theory 
as having the conviction that mental activity should be seen as a series 
of discrete, computational processes. There is a belief that formal 
systems describing such computations will provide us with the best and 
possibly only plausible psychological theories of human cognition. 
However, there is a marked difference between limited capacities and 
unbound competencies, and this difference has great psychological 
implications. Natural languages are infinite and so linguistic competence 
is unbounded, as are many of our other competencies. Harre and Gillett 
( 1994) describe the illusion of cognitive science with its technical 
sophistication of the programming model that has not been matched by 
a coherent theory of the relation between formal computation and real 
life thought. Wiley ( 1994) describes the difference between the human 
brain and a computer as differences in their points of view. The human 
is in the first person and the computer is in the third; computers 
therefore lack intentionality and their knowledge is mechanical in 
nature. According to Wiley, they can therefore know nothing, for they 
cannot reason in the informal, implicit, contextual ways that humans 
can. Nor can they pay attention to any number of factors or reflect on 
themselves. Computers lack reflexivity from within as it is not a 
property of the materials themselves, but of the organization humans 
give to them. Dennett (1980) describes functionalist theories as being at 
the subpersonal level, where people are analyzed in terms of 
acquisitions of subsystems. The behaviour of the whole person is seen 
as an outcome of the interaction of those subsystems. As a result 
consciousness is ignored. He maintains that only those models that 
include consciousness will work. 
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2. 11. The Normal and the Natural 
Whether we conceive of some developmental event as natural is for the 
most part a reflection of its normality within the socio-historical 
context. Assessment of children's abilities occur within a context of what 
is normal, but also in an often implicit context of what is thought to be 
natural in the course of development. The fact that early childhood care 
in institutionalized settings is becoming natural for most families is an 
example of how natural things are made normal. It is apparently 
natural for inf ants to desire the company of others and to need 
socialization from a very early age, such desires and needs being based 
on the normal custom that is now occurring in western societies to send 
children to be cared for in early childhood institutions. Whether they 
are natural or normal for the children, they are definitely advantageous 
for parents who wish to play a role that is valued in our society. Society 
devalues parenting as it creates a conflict between being a respectable 
solvent citizen and a good parent. According to Leach ( 1994) social 
institutions tend to isolate and not integrate public and personal aspects 
of life. With an overall social ethos of individualism and competition, 
this alienation impacts on families and their children. Leach claims that 
once social status and self image are not merely associated with, but 
built through, the accumulation of wealth itself, personal and pecuniary 
motives for work become inextricably entangled and unpaid activities 
degraded. 
Society insists that parents must care for their children while competing 
in the market place with those who do not have children. Post industrial 
western society expects parents to be responsible for their children's 
care and long term upbringing, without any viable social support. It is 
considered normal for children to spend most of their waking hours 
with people whose paid job it is to care for them. If one gives more time 
and effort to children, it might make one a better parent, but it will also 
make one less of a solvent citizen. Institutional daycare offers 
advantages to parents that have little to do with infants' safety or 
needs. In middle childhood many parents hand their children over to 
schools, assuming that they are the ideal focus for children's lives. 
Recognizing the prime social value of parenting and making space for it 
among other adult roles is not enough. It is plausible to suggest that 
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parents should not have rights over their children, but rights to 
society's help and support in parenting them. 
Meacham ( 1991) likens the domination of humans over nature, while 
still standing apart from it as similar to the domination of adults over 
children, while ignoring the interdependence of children and their 
parents within the same developmental course. Assessments of 
children's competencies are done from the standpoint that children are 
deficient and need intervention, manipulation and control. The 
objectives are to assess children early on so that there is a foundation of 
basic abilities on which intervention can be built and then to assess at a 
later stage the gains that have been made by the interventions. Kessen 
(1979) links this interventionist notion to a theme that has influenced 
child study this century - the ethic of personal responsibility. This has 
been brought about by the scientific need to identify causes and has led 
to a focus on someone assuming responsibility. Newman and Holzman 
(1993) see the dominance of causality and its role as an explanatory 
principle and topic to be investigated as permeating psychology. They 
see it as having a distorting and pernicious place in developmental 
psychology. This is based on the regularity view of causation, with its 
predictive value as opposed to a scientific realist's notion of causality as 
having a generative or productive nature. 
Meacham suggets the appropriateness of another context which focusses 
instead on the relationship between children and their parents or 
teachers, instead of positive or negative evaluations based on the parent 
or child. This suggestion has Vygotskian overtones to it, for it is the 
developmental course within which both are participants that is being 
assessed. There is little interest in intervention, because there is a 
recognition that humans are dependent on a healthy, natural 
environment and that the psychological development of parents 
depends on the proper development of their children. Parent and child 
life courses are not separate, as assumed with the image of domination 
of children; they are shared. Any crime against children escalates into a 
crime against the family and community. An example is provided when 
assessing the competence of a child to testify in a court. This 
competence is located within the system of relationships that include 
the child, the parents and their attitudes to compliance, lying and the 
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legal system. It includes the procedures that are adopted by legal 
representatives in preparing for and during testimony of a child. 
Assessment of competence to testify, as might be ordered by a judge, is 
not an assessment of something that inheres within the child, but is an 
assessment of the whole system of relationships. If there is a lack of 
competence to testify, then the lack is not the child's alone, but a lack in 
the system of potential relationships within which the child is 
embedded. This has implications for facilitating the child's competence, 
by directing actions not only to the child, but also the parents and the 
community. 
The traditional research focus on the child as an independent, isolated 
entity fails in its nonsocial attitude to the child and in the nonsocial 
experimental methods, which it seeks to impose on the child through its 
laboratory research paradigms. The restricted nature of the 
hypothetico-deductive model of inquiry is highlighted when it is 
contrasted to the scientific realist approach of theory generation and 
discovery. The methodologies of this alternative will be described in 
the next chapter where the research focus will be on the structures that 
lie behind the representational competencies and not the 
representations themselves. 
3 
A Methodological Perspective on 
Developmental Psychology 
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In conversation with Jean Briguier, Piaget recommended three 
strategies that would help foster creativity in research: 1) Read 
nothing in the field; read the literature in the field only afterwards; 2) 
Read as much as possible in related fields; 3) Have a whipping boy, 
like logical-positivism (1980, p. 127). These ideas are pertinent to 
scientists who are currently doing research. The hypothetico-
deductive approach in methodology has long been the dominant 
paradigm with much new research in this tradition continuing in the 
hypothesis testing vein. Ignoring the literature comprising these 
studies in accordance with Piaget's advice is constructive if one sees 
the need to break with the paradigm. The norms that are set by the 
hypothetico-deductive method readily make for bland, uncritical 
research. The fact that much hypothetico-deductive testing does little 
to further the growth of scientific knowledge seems irrelevant to 
many; what matters is that something has been produced. 
Piaget's recommendation to acquaint oneself with interdisciplinary 
fields is sound advice. The current trend appears to be towards more 
and more specialization. Experts in specialized fields are rewarded as 
their expertise continues to grow narrower. Generalists are 
increasingly becoming a feature of the past as is the importance of 
addressing the wider context in which one operates. The unfortunate 
consequence of having an extremely limited field of expertise is the 
restricted lifespan that much specialized knowledge seems to have. 
Those who have been trained with a broader perspective would be 
more adaptable to a changing reality. Even in medicine, the Guidelines 
for Guidelines ( 1996) warns against guidelines that are developed by 
experts or organisations with a narrow interest in a specific clinical 
problem. They may be completely inappropriate in more general 
settings. 
Piaget's suggestion of having a whipping boy is more of a standard 
against which one can offer alternatives. Logical positivism and the 
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hypothetico-deductive method, lend themselves to being whipping 
boys as their version of science has been shown to be a restricted and 
unsustainable one. Gergen ( 1979) claims that if theories are not(J 
derived from, nor dependent on, observations, as in logical empiricist! 
science, the theorist is then fundamentally free to engage in new 
theoretical departures. Likewise, Thagard's (1992) categorisation of 
discovery allows not only for discovery that is data driven, but also 
for discovery that is explanation and coherence driven.To the extent 
that Thagard is correct, this opens up the field to the possibility of 
new methodologies. 
This chapter considers a number of methodologies of relevance to 
psychology, namely the grounded theory approach of Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) as well as Haig's abductive account of scientific method 
( 19 8 7, 199 5), which itself provides a reconstruction of grounded 
theory. Grounded theory's formation as a comprehensive alternative 
to theory testing methodologies has been recast by Haig by placing it 
in a scientific realist framework. His abductive account of method 
which identifies problem solving, discovery and explanation as central 
features in a methodology is similarly based on a commitment to 
scientific realism. McGuire's contextualist approach (1983) emphasizes 
the contextual sensitivity of psychological research. In addition, the 
microgenetic method is suggested as a suitable approach to research 
with young children. It seeks to establish the processes that produce 
change over time; hence it has a developmental focus. This is achieved 
with a high density of observations over time as well as the use of 
verbal reports. Narrative writing is suggested as more appropriate to 
middle childhood and adolescence, with its emphasis on the 
development of communicative understanding. Assisted 
autobiography is presented as being appropriate for use with adults. 
It is not a record, but an interpretation of happenings and responses 
in someone's life, with the assistance of a team of experts. Different \/ 
ages and different problems need different methods if they are to be 






3. 1. THE CONTEXTUALIST APPROACH 
Contexts are not stable and permanent forms of reality, but rather 
constitute a reality that is developmental and transformative, in line 
with the scientific realist view of science. McGuire ( 1983) sees the 
current emphasis of empirical confrontation of theory and evidence as 
something that should not be a test of whether a theory is right or 
not, but a discovery process where the meaning of a hypothesis is 
made clear by disclosing its hidden assumptions and clarifying the 
circumstances under which it is true and those where it is false. 
McGuire contends that each hypothesis is true in a few appropriate 
contexts, yet dangerously false in others. This is reinforced by recent 
work in the philosophy of science by Cartwright ( 1983) who argues 
that "the laws of physics lie." 
Contextualists see the first phase of initial hypothesis generation as 
being followed by a second empirical confrontation phase that 
continues and does not reverse the discovery process. Empirical 
confrontation of theory is a continuing revelation of its full meaning 
with its pattern of confirmation and disconfirmation in a set of 
different situations. Wide ranging contrasting theories can be valid in 
certain contexts, hence one should not test for the truth but the 
discovery of patterns in contexts. Adequate understanding of a 
phenomenon according to contextualists, require that it be 
investigated through a programme of research that is planned to 
reveal a wide range of circumstances that affect the phenomenon. 
There are innumerable theoretical representations for any situation, 
depending on the context. An integrated stylistic aspect to research is 
therefore needed. 
McGuire dismisses the convergent unilinear style as used in attitude 
change research of the 40's and S0's. He likewise dismisses the 
divergent unilinear style which stresses the independent variable 
over the dependent variable. He favours a systems style of research 
where knowledge representations are allowed to reflect the 
complexities of real world situations which are being represented, 
allowing for the study of a complex set of variables. Some are seen as 
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independent, others as mediating, some as dependent, while all can 
covary naturally. This allows for the detection of multiple causal 
pathways whose contribution to covariance can fluctuate from one 
context to another. 
McGuire criticizes the quality of mainstream social psychological 
research where an isolated study is planned and conducted and the 
outcome is reported in accordance with the preferred theory, the 
programme is then dropped and a study designed to confirm a new 
derivation from the theory. Adequate understanding of both theory 
and phenomena require them to be investigated through a 
programme of research that is planned to reveal a wide range of 
circumstances that affect the phenomena and a set of implicit 
assumptions that limit the theory. The contexts in which one or 
another relation obtains has to be made explicit. He sees the need for 
a programme of empirical research that will reveal the patterns of 
empirical contexts in which alternative conceptualizations manifest 
themselves. The three dimensions to research in McGuire's 
programme entail: 1) Manifestation of the phenomenon; 2) Methods 
that can be used; and 3) Types of explanations that can be theorized. 
Empirical confrontation needs to be treated as a continuing discovery 
process, with recognition being given to the existence and use of a 
wide range of formulations that can generate insight. It is 
advantageous that these contextualist priorities are incorporated into 
an abductive methodology congruent with a scientific realist view of 
science which sees theories as being primarily explanatory rather 
than predictive. Contextualism also encourages a more wholistic 
approach towards contexts and does not restrict researchers to 
empirical levels. 
3. 2. GROUNDED THEORY 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) developed a grounded theory approach to 
methodology in response to the overemphasis on theory verification 
that was and still is current. Grounded theory calls for the 
abandonment of random assignment of subjects to treatments, the use 
of large numbers of participants and the de-emphasis of hypothesis 
testing, experimental control and statistical testing. The emphasis 
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should rather be on theory generation through the inductive 
examination of information gleaned from data. The goal is to construct 
theories so as to understand phenomena. Rennie, Phillips and Quartaro 
( 19 8 8) used grounded theory in their psychotherapy process 
research. They were attracted to it because it offered an opportunity 
to create theory in a subject area that has been traditionally difficult 
to access with traditional hypothetico-deductive methods. They 
regard it as a useful strategy that can be broadly applied within 
psychology. Glaser and Strauss' grounded theory methodology is 
described below along with comments by Rennie et al. 
3. 2. 1. The Constant Comparative Method 
Glaser and Strauss advocate the use of the constant comparative 
method, which entails the systematic categorization of data, with 
theorizing only occurring after patterns in the data begin to emerge 
from the categorizing operation. This requires the data to be collected, 
categorized and memoed, moving towards parsimony through the 
determination of a core category, recycling of earlier steps, sorting of 
memos and then finally the writing up of the theory. 
3. 2. 2. Data Collection 
Initially the researcher focusses on what is central to the 
phenomenon. Participants are selected who seem to represent the 
phenomenon; this is done to maximize the chances of the phenomenon 
occurring. The selection of data sources needs one or more comparison 
groups. Glaser and Strauss refer to this as theoretical sampling. Groups 
can be compared even on the basis of a single dimension if it is judged 
to be pertinent to the emerging theory. As the number of comparison 
groups increases, the conditions and limits of the theory unfold. 
3. 2. 3. Categorization 
The choice of an analytic unit is arbitrary, but should be consistently 
used. Rennie et al (1988) used meaning units of individual concepts as 
their analytic unit. They recommend that the category generation 
initially be descriptive, so that the name of the category closely 
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reflects the language used by respondents. Each unit is assigned to as 
many categories as possible. If no categories fit a given unit, a new 
category is developed to represent it. Categories are descriptive as 
well as constructed and relationships between categories are 
developed. As the analysis proceeds, it becomes clear that some 
categories are the defining characteristics of properties of other 
categories. The categories begin to saturate, where the addition of 
further protocols reveal no further categories or relationships among 
them. Achieving the saturation of categories is an extremely labour 
intensive exercise. 
3. 2. 4. Memoing 
As the data are collected and analysed, ideas occur throughout the 
process. These ideas get recorded in the form of memos by the 
researcher. They help give insight into guiding assumptions. They 
raise the conceptual awareness of the researcher to think beyond 
single occurrences to themes and patterns in the data. They preserve 
premature ideas about categories or relationships that might be used 
at a later stage. They also record similarities between the emerging 
theory and existing theories. 
3. 2. 5. The Movement Toward Parsimony 
After saturation has occurred, the focus shifts towards relationships 
among the categories. Some are seen to be central, as they have links 
with many others. It becomes apparent that there is a network of 
categories that form a hierarchical structure where central categories 
subsume lower-order ones. Categories that have few connections with 
the emerging structure are dropped or collapsed into other categories. 
Effort is directed towards finding the most central category. 
3. 2. 6. Writing the Theory 
The main repository is the researcher's memo. It is here that ideas 
about potential categories and their relationships are noted. This 
conceptual material is the basis of the grounded theory. Memos are 
sorted, with new ones being created contributing to the generation of 
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a central category. It provides the organizational structure for the 
write up of the theory. 
In principle anything can be addressed and widening the scope of 
research can be quite broad. The absence of external criteria makes it 
impossible to validate the truth value of individual verbal reports. 
However, the constant comparative method demonstrates that 
different individuals do say the same thing, hence giving credibility to 
individual accounts. Grounded theorists seek intimacy with the 
phenomena rather than external criteria of adequacy that verify 
theory. The object is to create new theory that is directed at the 
reality of individuals. The object is not to verify the theory; this is 
deliberately left to subsequent studies.The problem of limited 
generalizability is not resolved but accepted as the price to pay for 
research that is closely tied to the phenomenon it addresses. 
Grounded theory accesses areas of human experience that traditional 
methods find impossible to address. 
3. 3. AN ABDUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF METHOD 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) have argued for the inductive discovery of 
theory which is grounded in systematically analyzed data. Haig 
( 198 7,199 5) offers a reconstruction of the grounded theory 
perspective on social science inquiry. He takes the view that grounded 
theory is best regarded as a general theory of scientific method, which 
is concerned with the detection and explanation of social phenomena. 
He proposes to reconstruct it as a problem-solving endeavour where 
theories are abductively generated from robust data patterns, 
elaborated through the construction of plausible models and justified 
in terms of their explanatory coherence. Haig believes that grounded 
theory can be strengthened by reconstructing it in accordance with 
recent developments in scientific realist methodology. He terms this 
account the abductive account of method. It suggests that the theory 
of scientific method is centrally concerned with generating theories 
abductively and appraising them in terms of what philosophers have 
come to call inference to the best explanation (Harman, 1968). 
Inference refers to the movement of thought within a sphere of belief 
and its function is to accept or reject propositions on the basis of 
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purported evidence. The best explanation is not a judgement of truth, 
as we do not have independent access to this, but it is a summary 
judgement of accessible explanatory virtues. 
Josephson et al ( 1994) describe abduction as occurring when a doctor 
has to come up with a best explanation for symptoms. The diagnostic 
conclusion should explain the symptoms; it should be plausible and be 
significantly better than any alternative explanation. Abduction is 
concerned with explaining underlying mechanisms and is a fallible 
inference aimed at the production of truth. Deduction within the 
hypothetico-deductive method is truth preserving with the aim of 
conveying conclusive evidence. It is apparent that these two types of 
inference are based on different views of science. Abduction is based 
on a scientific realist view which sees knowledge as being fallible, 
where the truth is not given and known beforehand, but arises in our 
pursuit of it. Objects of our knowledge exist and act independently of 
the knowledge of which they are objects, so the knowledge we possess 
always consists in historically specific social forms. Abductive 
inferences are knowledge producing inferences despite their 
fallibility. They invoke a process of reasoning from an effect to a 
cause, of reasoning to an explanation. For the realist, the objects of 
scientific inquiry are not empirically given, but are real structures to 
be theorized about (Bhaskar, 1979). Deduction is based on a logical 
empiricist view, which holds that truth is given and we can come to 
know it if we perfect our measuring tools. The focus of Glaser and 
Strauss is on inductive inference, which sees the content of its theory 
coming from the data itself. Abductive inference sees theory as being 
generated from data patterns, but being about the cause of these 
patterns. 
3. 3. 1. Problem Formulation 
Central to the abductive account of scientific method is the selection 
and formulation of problems. Haig suggests the constraint-composition 
theory (Nickles, 1981) as an appropriate account of problems. This 
asserts that a problem comprises all the constraints on its own 
solution, along with the demand that the solution be found. The 
constraints are therefore part of the problem, they characterize and 
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give the problem its structure. In describing the problem we are 
literally halfway to solving it. Haig sugests that Glaser and Strauss 
regard problems and method as separate parts of an inquiry. Strauss 
asserts that method comes before the problem in the false belief that 
science has a natural beginning and ending. Haig believes that 
research begins wherever it is appropriate for researchers to enter it. 
Likewise, Haig criticizes Glaser and Strauss for their conception of 
problems as being a temporal phase that are dealt with by the 
researcher, who then moves on to another phase. Haig's abductive 
explanatory inferentialism sees researchers dealing with problems all 
the time. Problems are generated, selected, developed and modified. 
They regulate our thinking in the context of theory generation, 
development and appraisal. 
3. 3. 2. Phenomena Detection 
Haig likens grounded theory to the hypothetico-deductive method, in 
that while they offer different accounts of inquiry, they share the 
view that scientific theories explain and predict facts about observed 
data. They do not draw a distinction between data and phenomena. 
Theories however are constructed to explain phenomena and not data. 
Grounded theory should be grounded in phenomena and not data. 
Haig draws the distinction between phenomena as being relatively 
stable recurrent general features, whereas data are idiosyncratic to 
particular contexts. Data serve as evidence for phenomena and tend to 
be observable, whereas phenomena are not. Data are collected and 
analyzed with the aim of extracting robust data patterns or 
phenomena from the data (Woodward, 1989). Haig suggests that 
before theories are generated, grounded theorists need to first 
reliably establish phenomena. Concerning the construction of theory, 
he distinguishes between the different types of abduction: 1) 
Existential abduction which often occurs in theory generation; 2) 
Analogical abduction which frequently plays a role in theory 
development; and 3) Abduction as inference to the best explanation, 
which is centrally involved in theory appraisal. 
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3. 3. 3. Theory Generation 
Haig suggests that Strauss' characterization of scientific method 
invokes the inductive generation of theory followed by deduction and 
verification. However with Peirce, he suggests that the creative 
inference involved in theory generation is existential abduction. This 
involves reasoning back from puzzling phenomena in order to 
generate explanations of the causes underlying phenomena. 
Abductive inference suggests that certain phenomena are 
encountered which are surprising as they do not follow on from any 
accepted hypothesis. These phenomena would follow as a matter of 
course from a new hypothesis and so the researcher concludes that 
the new hypothesis is plausible and needs to be investigated. 
Existential abduction cites indirect causal mechanisms without being 
able to provide specific detail about these mechanisms. 
3. 3. 4. Theory Development 
Haig believes that many psychological theories are seriously 
underdeveloped and suffer from being tested prematurely. The type 
of abduction involved in theory development is analogical. While we 
do not have knowledge of the causal mechanisms that are being 
probed abductively, we are entitled to construct models of those 
mechanisms by imagining something analagous to the mechanisms 
whose nature we do know. Harre (1976, 1978) sees this creative task 
as contributing to a more informed characterisation of a theory's 
causal mechanisms. An analogue of the primitively understood causal 
mechanism is developed by drawing on an appropriate source, which 
is usually familiar and understood. 
3. 3. 5. Theory Appraisal 
The hypothetico-deductive method of theory appraisal is used when 
theories are tested for empirical adequacy by finding out whether 
their test predictions have been borne out by the relevant data. Haig 
maintains that proper theory appraisal has to include evaluative 
dimensions as well as empirical adequacy. Scientific inquiry pursues 
multiple goals, which demands that a theory meet criteria other than 
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that of empirical adequacy. Other criteria include consilience, 
explanatory depth and simplicity. The type of abduction involved in 
mature theory appraisal is inference to the best explanation. This 
approach is consistent with the scientific realist view, where a theory 
is accepted when it is judged to provide a better explanation of the 
evidence than its rivals. Thagard's ( 1989, 1992) account of theory 
evaluation takes inference to the best explanation as being centrally 
concerned with establishing explanatory coherence. This is where 
propositions hold together because of their explanatory relations 
which are established through the operation of the principles of: 
symmetry, explanation, analogy, data priority, contradiction, 
competition and acceptability. The determination of the explanatory 
coherence of a theory is made in terms of consilience, simplicity and 
analogy. According to Thagard a theory is explanatorily coherent 
when it explains a greater range of facts than its rivals; fewer special 
assumptions are made and it is consistent with theories that have 
already found credibility with scientists. The theory of explanatory 
coherence offers grounded theory an integrated account of many of 
the evaluative criteria which are deemed important for theory 
appraisal by Glaser and Strauss. 
Haig's reconstruction of Glaser and Strauss' account of grounded 
theory is not meant as an accurate report of grounded theory, but as a 
recasting of it. The abductive approach to method provides a 
framework for inquiry based on a scientific realist view of science. 
According to Haig (1995) knowledge is advanced by abductive 
explanatory inference by scientists, who are abductively generating 
theories to explain puzzling phenomena, elaborating their plausible 
guesses with analogical reasoning to appropriate models and 
appraising their theoretical efforts in terms of their explanatory 
power. Scientists are thus theory builders who are concerned with 
generating explanatory theories in order to obtain a representational 
grip on the world. The abductive approach to scientific method creates 
theories which comply with Thagard's (1988) stipulation for scientific 
theories to be adequate. They are practically adequate in that they 
can be shared by the wider community of scientists; they are 
historically adequate as they describe how theories develop over time 
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and they are philosophically adequate as they contribute to plausible 
solutions to other central scientific and philosophical problems. 
3. 4. THE MICROGENETIC METHOD 
The central feature of developmental psychology is the change that 
occurs during a lifespan. However, this feature has been an extremely 
difficult one to determine. There has been little progress in 
understanding change mechanisms, mainly because of the difficulty 
in devising effective methods. Appelbaum and McCall ( 1983) noted, 
"In contrast to other specialities, the study of development is the 
study of change .... But developmental psychology has often not been 
truly developmental, and therefore it has not seriously faced the 
methodological issues unique to its definitional purpose " (p. 415). 
Siegler and Crowley ( 1991) suggest that theoretical progress is being 
made in understanding basic mechanisms, which in turn demands 
that progress be made in methods that will indicate in which direction 
research should be taken. 
Most research that has been done in developmental psychology has 
only indirectly assessed change. Both cross-sectional and longitudinal 
designs tell little about the processes that produce change. Many 
researchers have hoped that these designs would be more informative 
as to the changes that occur over different ages. However, as Siegler 
and Crowley ( 1991) point out, these designs tell more about the 
stability of individual differences, than about the processes that 
caused the changes. The crucial factor in studying development is the 
density of observations during the period of change relative to the 
rate of change of the phenomenon. An example of a hurricane creating 
havoc on a town illustrates this idea. The overall effect of the 
hurricane's progress and destruction is better understood with before, 
during and after photographs of the town. Thus observation and 
measurement of ongoing changes allows one to analyse the relation 
between the damage being done and changes in wind pressures, cloud 
formations and other causal influences. Changes that occur in 
cognitive development follow a similar path. The development of 
understanding of liquid quantity conservation can be done with 
children of different ages. This indicates how children understand the 
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concept at each age. Likewise, the false belief test can be given to 
children of different ages and this would reveal how they understand 
the concept at each specific age. None of this would, however, show 
how the change occurred. Intense sampling of behaviours must 
coincide with the period during which the rate of change is relatively 
rapid. Observations would ideally begin just before the change began 
and would continue until a point of relative stability was reached. 
Changes that are closely age-linked are more directly observed when 
there is overlap between the period of dense observations and the 
period of rapid change. Most changes are not that closely bound to 
particular ages, with variability of age acquisition occurring in years 
rather than weeks. 
The microgenetic method is one that is particularly suited to studying 
change. There are three features which define this method: 1) 
Observations span the entire period from the beginning of the change 
to the time at which it reaches a relatively stable state. 2) The density 
of observations is high relative to the rate of change of the 
phenomenon. 3) Observed behaviour is subjected to intensive trial-
by-trial analysis, with the aim of inferring the processes that give rise 
to both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of change. The 
microgenetic method is a method that is typically suited to studying 
younger children, while still being suited to older children and adults. 
Its strengths lie in the dense observations and the verbal reports over 
a period of time, that combined, give valuable insight into the 
mechanisms that cause changes to occur. I discuss this method in 
detail because it is one of the few truly developmental methods 
available. 
There are not many microgenetic experiments being conducted 
because they are not easy to administer and take a lot of time to 
conduct. Subjects are tested individually and videotaping of 
performances for each subject is required to determine when changes 
occur. However, despite all the impediments, they appear to be 
gaining more attention, largely because of the high quality data that 
they yield. 
96 
3. 4. 1. A Micro genetic Study Of Strategy Discovery 
Siegler and Jenkins (1989) conducted a study on four and five year 
olds' discovery of the min strategy for adding numbers. This study is 
a good example of how the microgenetic method is effective with 
young children. A detailed description of their study is given as it will 
reveal how simple but effective this approach can be. 
The min strategy is an approach to adding that involves counting up 
from the larger addend the number of times indicated by the smaller 
addend. A child using the min strategy to solve 2 + 5 would start at 5 
and count upward 2 counts, the child would think "5, 6, 7". Groen and 
Parkman (1972) hypothesized that young children use the min 
strategy to solve single-digit addition problems. Their evidence was 
based on the size of the smaller addend being a predictor of solution 
times on different problems. They found that problems such as 7 + 2 
elicited shorter times and problems such as 5 + 4, longer ones. To 
account for this finding, they proposed the min model. Variation in 
solution times was predicted to be a linear function of the number of 
counts upwards. Subsequent findings supported this, with the size of 
the smaller addend a good predictor of solution times. 
Carpenter & Moser ( 1982) found that children reported using a 
variety of strategies, describing five or more different approaches. 
This divergence between self reports and the min model suggested 
that either the children's verbal reports were inaccurate, as Nisbett 
and Wilson ( 19 7 7) suggest, or their verbal reports were accurate and 
the results did not imply consistent use of the min strategy. Siegler 
(1987) found that the min model was the best predictor of solution 
times as well as children reporting using not only the min, but also at 
least three other strategies. To find out whether the children were 
consistently using the min strategy or other multiple strategies, 
Siegler divided the solution times on each problem according to the 
strategy that children were classified as using on the basis of their 
verbal report and videotape of their nonverbal behaviour during the 
problem. Where children were classified as using the min strategy, 
the min model was a better predictor of solution times on each 
problem than past studies; where the children used a different 
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strategy, it was not a good predictor. This suggested that children use 
multiple strategies on problems where they said that they did. These 
findings provided background for Siegler and Jenkins ( 19 8 9) 
experiment, by indicating an appropriate age group, assessment 
technique and description of typical development to provide an 
appropriate context for the findings. 
The major problem with microgenetic methods is that the discovery 
or competence may not occur in the time available for study. In 
Siegler and Jenkins' trial, seven of the eight children made the 
discovery in the eleven weeks, however the time that they required 
varied. A common view is that discoveries will only occur on difficult 
problems that canot be solved in other ways; this is called impasse 
driven learning. Discoveries in this experiment, however, were 
inconsistent with this view. It was found that discoveries can occur 
while solving easy, difficult or moderately difficult problems. Most of 
the discoveries occurred on problems that the child had solved 
correctly earlier on and with no apparent difficulty. This points to the 
inadequacy in current approaches in cognitive development that most 
approaches depict change in terms of static states marked by 
occasional periods of change. Change has been relegated to a 
conditional status. However, the findings from Siegler and Jenkin's 
strategic discovery experiment seem to indicate change as the norm. 
This view of cognitive activity would allow for a view of mechanisms 
that produce a flow of variations from which innovations can emerge. 
Discovery of the min strategy did not immediately lead to widespread 
generalization. It was used only occasionally at first, hence suggesting 
against popular expectation, that discovery of a new strategy does not 
immediately lead to its application. This is pertinent to much research 
that is focussed on finding the lowest age at which a child can display 
a strategy or competency. A first application of a new strategy does 
not necessarily confirm a mastery. There is a difference between the 
discovery and mastery of a strategy. Siegler and Crowley suggest that 
it is only as people use new concepts and strategies that they fully 
comprehend the advantages, disadvantages and conditions of their 
applicability. Understanding of the strategy only comes with its use. 
This is congruent with the arguments of Chapman and Chandler 
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( 1991) who state that much research is focussed on a successful 
display of early competency, from which claims are then made about 
the child possessing a competence. However, this competence has yet 
to be generalized and so become a stable structure. Hence the need for 
a more developmental focus such as the microgenetic method, which 
would encourage a process orientation to the study of competencies. 
The microgenetic model would be of use particularly with younger 
children, where sole reliance on their verbal reports is of limited 
value, given their limited linguistic repertoire. Likewise much 
research that has attempted to place children in the field and carry 
out observations has been inadequate in that it cannot explain the 
processes that caused the change. Dense observations of behavioural 
change as well as the focus on verbal reports which the microgenetic 
method offers, would seem to be the best approach to investigating 
younger children's competencies. It also allows for the earliest 
detection of the prediscovery phase, the actual discovery of the 
strategy and then the gradual generalization as the competency 
becomes stabilized. This often occurs over a longer period of time than 
most researchers are interested in. In short, the microgenetic method 
would enable researchers to reintroduce development to 
developmental research. 
3. 5. NARRATIVE WRITING 
Fox (1991) believes that the problem of whether children's knowledge 
of the mind is a product of spontaneous action and reflection, or 
whether it is a product of socialization, will never be resolved 
empirically. The extent to which children make their knowledge in 
this area explicit depends largely on the challenges and opportunities 
that face them. Literature is a potent form of representation of the 
mental world in literate cultures. Before the advent of psychology, 
mental phenomena were probably discussed in the contexts of 
religious and literary discourse. Children in most countries are 
nowadays introduced to narrative accounts of human behaviour from 
an early age. 
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Fox (1987, 1990) carried out a study into the representation of social 
cognition in children's narrative writing. Children aged seven, nine, 
eleven and thirteen were chosen to write two specially commissioned 
narratives, as well as a third piece of non-narrative writing. The 
written narrative can be viewed as consisting of one or more 
characters in an environment who take action in the light of a 
predicament. The predicament is resolved in some or other way. 
The study was undertaken under the pretext of finding out what 
kinds of stories children write at different ages. Content analysis of 
characterisation was carried out on each story. Ratings corresponded 
to five levels of developing attainment: Level one was where a single 
character pursues simple goals and thought and action are not clearly 
differentiated. Level two was where characters interact physically 
and where thinking was about action. Level three involved thinking 
characters exchanging information with a self-reflective protagonist. 
Level four was where characters were realized as individuals with 
feelings and attitudes. At level five, characters were presented in 
roles and relationships at a generalized level. 
Fox acknowledges that there are difficulties in arriving at 
unambiguous quantitative analyses of written stories. Some stories 
will produce writing which is more differentiated by age then others. 
The trends and principal findings, however, were apparent and 
warranted further inquiry. He found that seven year olds could only 
represent the very simplest states of knowledge and motivation with 
a single character. He found that when children of this age write 
stories they focus mainly on observable actions of characters and only 
introduce mental states when they bear directly on the wants and 
purposes of the characters. The nine year olds could be roughly split 
in half, with half remaining at level two and half at level three. Level 
two depicts stories that restrict mental states to a single character. 
The writer's focus is on the observable world of actions and their 
consequences. Those who reached level three could depict more than 
one character as having an inner world of thought. 
Fox found that as children get older the distribution of attainments 
becomes more scattered. Eleven year olds were spread across all the 
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levels as were thirteen year olds. A few remained stuck at a level 
where there was minimal acknowledgement of an inner mental world 
and subjective point of view. This type of study is heavily dependent 
on the child's ability and skill in transcription, composition and 
decision making. The absolute ages at which different features of 
development are attained are of less interest than the nature of the 
course of development. Greater emphasis is on the development of 
communicative understanding and the representation of the inner 
world of thought and feeling. The more successful eleven and thirteen (/ 
year olds accompany the world of action with an inner world of 
psychological experience. The common-sense ways in which we try to 
understand ourselves and others as people can draw on this 
interpretative tradition of plausible narrative readings more than on 
logical and rational tests of explicit hypotheses. 
The narrative method of research is particularly useful with 
adolescents and children of middle childhood. Their linguistic skills 
are rapidly developing and have a great effect on the development of 
their communication skills. Research that tries to focus on children's 
understanding of mental entities relies heavily on the children's 
ability to communicate this linguistically. Narrative writing is another 
form of communication where children are required to struggle with 
their depiction of characters' mental states in their stories. This 
depiction requires that they articulate their understanding into a 
deliberate and conscious form or written expression. Understanding 
that is conveyed in narrative form might be more stable than that 
conveyed in verbal reports, as it requires more conscious deliberation. 
Narrative writing can be used in a way that is complementary to 
other methods. It does not have to be treated as a separate 
methodology as will be seen with the Brussels Method in the next 
section. 
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3. 6. AUTOBIOGRAPHY AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL METHOD 
De Waele and Harre (1979) describe the autobiographical method, 
where an individual is assisted by a team in the production of a 
document which is a representation of how one views one's own life, 
knowledge, beliefs and principles of action and judgement. This 
method would not be suited to young children who have a limited 
linguistic repertoire, however is well suited to adolescents and adults. 
Much developmental research fails to discriminate appropriate 
methods for different age groups. While the microgenetic method is a 
general method, it is well suited to younger children, whereas this 
autobiographical method would be inappropriate with three and four 
year olds. 
De Waele and Harre draw a distinction between an assisted 
autobiography and other forms of biography. Biographies tend to rely 
on first person information in the form of documents, whose 
interpretation is done by the biographer. The biographer's influence 
on the research is seen in the system of concepts that they impose on 
the contents rather than being drawn from the life of the subject. 
Further, an assisted autobiography is not a diary, which is a record 
that is compiled at the time incidents are recorded. An assisted 
autobiography does not have a subject; it is a cooperative exercise in 
revealing the life conceptions of the central participant and is a 
recollection and interpretation of episodes in a person's life and the 
author's relation to them. 
An autobiography is a psychological method in which the biography is 
transformed by a team of experts who work with the participant in 
creating a document that represents their conception of their life. If 
there are universal features in the historical development of human 
lives, they can be demonstrated by comparing documents recording 
individual lives with respect to the themes that their construction has 
been based on. The meaning of episodes is derived from the 
interpretation of the people who participate in the episode; it is not 
imposed from without in a prior scheme invented by investigators. 
There is no manipulation of people as subjects in experiments. 
Participants' interpretations are taken seriously. Hence there is no 
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falsification of reality which occurs when things are prepared in 
advance by the investigator. This is a participatory methodology 
which recognizes that social interaction involves a variety of 
interactive mechanisms. 
3. 6. 1. Neglect of the Method 
The autobiographical method has been ignored by psychologists as 
questions about their objectivity, reliability and validity are raised, 
concerns which originate from psychometric theory. The initial 
autobiography is the result of the participant writing their own story. 
This however is only the first step. It is not a goal on its own, but part 
of a wider reconstruction. The data featured in the sketch are 
investigated further by specially designed interviews, where it is 
checked and compared with data from other sources. The validity of 
such a document is not dependent on its objectivity. It is desirable 
and necessary that the document contains data that reflects the 
attitude and interpretations of the participant. The participant's view 
of their own life situation is important in interpretation, as the 
meaning of specific acts only become clear when they are related to 
articulation of past experience. 
Behaviourist research has tended to neglect the whole person and 
focus instead on fragments of unrelated aspects of personality. Little 
attention is given to subjects' own reports about their interpretations 
of their existence. The autobiographical method is a collaborative one 
where participants and investigators work in a team. Focused Account 
Eliciting interviews involve negotiation with the participant over 
accounts of their past experiences. Another reason why the 
autobiographical method has been ignored is because it contains 
developmental concepts referring to the continuity in an individual's 
development. The developmental concept is something that traditional 
research methods such as laboratory experiments have failed to 
incorporate, largely due to their restrictive approaches. Personal 
documents are also difficult to adapt to statistical methods and their 
application to detailed content analysis risks destroying the meaning 
contained in the document as a whole. 
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3. 6. 2. The Brussels Method 
The assisted autobiographical method was developed in Brussels with 
convicted murderers. Its aim was to understand their lives in order to 
make sense of their acts of murder and to assess their potential for 
parole. The research team consisted of the participant, a prisoner, who 
as a volunteer received a salary along with the professional members 
of the team, which also included a sociologist, psychologist, medical 
doctor and so on. The task of the autibiography genesis is to learn 
about an individual's way of conceiving their life, their predicaments 
with a view to solving their problems. 
The central participant is invited to write their own autobiography in 
their own terms, in their own time and to their own satisfaction. This 
text is then divided up into the number of time-slices that is the same 
number as members on the team. Each member then tries to 
reconstruct from their slice the rest of that life as it has so far been 
lived. This involves negotiation, where the participant negotiates their 
narrative with the professionals, which leads to new documents 
where revisions are incorporated. The negotiations occur between 
professionals and with the participant and the final product forms the 
basic text. This method has seldom been used in practice. 
In Oxford, topic-orientations have been added to this time-oriented 
method. The naive autobiography is dismembered and reassembled 
according to a nine-fold thematic scheme. A Biographical Inventory is 
used, along with Problem and Conflict Situations ( detailed in section 
3.6.4) and Social Enquiry, a detailed investigation of the social and 
physical environment of the participant. The object of this is to make 
the reconstruction of the life-course systematic. The scheme consists 
of a microsociological framework which incorporates a time 
perspective, social ecology and socioeconomic living conditions. Social 
psychological life-patterns incorporate family and groups, the cultural 
pattern of values, norms, expectations and roles and the institutional 
(prison) situation. Individual characteristics involve self descriptions 
and interpretations, interests, occupational and leisure-time activities 
and the goals, aspirations and conflicts of the participant. These topics 
are connected with the Biographical Inventory. The investigator can 
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draw comparisons between the initial autobiography and the 
Biographical Inventory. This leads to a qualitative approach, with the 
emphasis on themes in an individual's life mentioned in the naive 
autobiography or explored in subsequent discussions. The emphasis is 
on the meaning the data has for the participant as well as for the 
other members of the team. 
About ten successive readings of the basic autobiography are 
necessary. It is necessary for the team of experts to become fully 
familiar with the complete reading as well as drawing up an 
inventory of the themes that are dealt with in the autobiography. The 
document gets coded with respect to the appearances and 
reappearances of these themes. The data gets analysed under the 
topics of the scheme. Some data will get classified into more than one 
topic, which means that they can be considered from a different point 
of view and so their meaning is changed along with a change in 
perspective. The analyst has to consider whether subjects get 
attended to implicitly or explicitly by the participant in their 
autobiography. Explicit references comprise the manifest content of 
the autobiography, while implicit references cover topics which are 
supposed to be presented by the analyst. Each analyst forms 
hypotheses about the particular theme that they are dealing with. 
These are explored in comparison with other data sources, other 
investigators and with further accounts from the participant. The nine 
thematic readers and the participant now engage in ordering the 
sequence of negotiations as each reader tries to reconstruct the 
remaining themes on the basis of common sense knowledge. The 
participant is used to settle differences in opinion that have emerged 
in the reconstruction. 
3. 6. 3. The Method of Negotiating 
The Interviewing Rule is a fundamental constituent of the 
biographical method. According to this rule, every answer given to a 
question, every statement produced by the subject and all available 
documents about the participant, must be submitted to an interview, 
to make explicit the content and form of the constructs which the 
participant uses to describe and explain their life. The Focused 
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Account Eliciting interview allows the subject to produce 
supplementary documents. This interview uses a series of focussing 
techniques to obtain accounts from. the participant. Its focus is on the 
generative m.echanism.s that lie behind behavioural phenomena, the 
written and spoken statements used by the participant and, through 
this, the various episodes that are named. This will lead to a 
reconstruction of the participant's cognitive resources. The interview 
is centred on the subject's experiences, definitions and the meaning 
they attribute to different episodes. These accounts serve to make 
actions intelligible by locating them. within a structure as part of the 
biography or by locating them. in the life-world. Ordinary accounts 
achieve meaning through settling the meaning assigned to the 
environment and actions and by ref erring to the rules of action as 
well as role requirements in monitoring social behaviour. 
Meanings can be explicit or implicit. People's accounts of their doings 
usually involve reference to rules and other normative principles. 
Accounts elicited in these interviews are not responses to stimuli, but 
occur between people negotiating meanings in certain roles. The type 
of com.m.unication involved depends on how accounts are asked for 
and how they are given, accepted or rejected. 
There are three stages in the focused account eliciting interview: 
Stage one: Reflexive Questions 
In the first stage of the interview reflexive questions are asked about 
the process of interpreting and answering the questions in written 
form.. Accounts generated by these questions provide a general 
background which prepares the way for direct questions of the second 
stage. Non-verbal communication is carefully noted and recorded with 
reference to the context in which they occurred. 
Stage two: Direct Questions 
These involve informative questions whose aim. is to collect factual 
knowledge about a specific topic. Ordering questions permit the team 
to make comparisons and classify data, while questions about choices 
between alternatives and possibilities induce the subject to explain 
how one alternative was chosen by them.. Questions formulate the 
conditions under which certain events took place. Finally objections 
are regarded as alternative accounts which are proposed to the 
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subject, while flaws in their argument are offered to them and they 
are asked for their opinion. 
Stage three: Reflexive Questions 
These reflexive questions are aimed at the second stage of the 
interviews. The negotiation of accounts and underlying meanings are 
explored. The various types of argument and rhetoric used by the 
participant are discussed. The result of the Focused Account Eliciting 
and cross-negotiation is a new autobiographical text. 
3. 6. 4. Problems and Conflict Situations 
The new autobiographical text is used to identify longitudinal themes. 
The development of lives studied in the Brussels report is 
characterized by conflict and crisis situations. The biographer has to 
grasp the structure of the situations as conceived by the participant 
and the way they try to resolve them. The participant is asked to 
identify situations in their life which have the same characteristics as 
certain standardized conflict situations experienced in the prison and 
which have been artificially constructed by the team for his or her 
benefit. The participant is asked to experience a range of conflict 
situations of increasing difficulty, the last being highly stressful and 
insoluble in the given conditions. The participant is then asked to pick 
out situations in their life story that are similar to the conflict 
situations they have experienced in prison. The individual therefore 
relives part of their life again in terms of common features that he or 
she has identified for themselves. The autobiography is then seen to 
be an interpretation of happenings and responses, and not a record. 
According to De Waele and Harre, the autobiography provides a 
cognitive map of how the individual now represents their life to 
themselves and the resources by which they have coped or failed to 
cope with their problems. Autobiographical accounts are concerned 
with accounts that allow a representation to be formed of a person's 
current cognitive resources. This method, like the microgenetic 
method, takes a long time to unfold. The quality of the data, however, 
should compensate for this. 
Much current research in psychology is done within a paradigm which 
allows for the relatively quick confirmation or disconfirmation of the 
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statistical null hypothesis. Quality research would seem to require 
more time to be spent than is currently catered for in the research 
sector of tertiary systems. Collaborative or team research that focuses 
on problem areas would encourage a more wholistic attitude to real-
life problems. Every researcher would be a valuable member in a 
system that was guided by problems. Thus research would be 
potentially valuable regardless of whether it produced statistically 
significant conclusions. 
One of the central tasks of a scientist is to explain puzzling phenomena 
that occur and to this end research can be regarded as a problem-
solving endeavour. The abductive account of method seeks to explain 
the causes that lie behind phenomena and generates theory from 
robust data patterns. However, this can only be done once the 
phenomena have been adequately investigated. The testing of the 
theory occurs a long way down the track compared to the practice of 
immediate testing with the hypothetico-deductive method. 
Researchers have, until very recently, used a range of quantitative 
tools that have limited the kinds of models and theories they have 
been willing to entertain. The tools that have been used in 
experimental research have lent themselves to being easily measured 
or manipulated and are interactive only in an additive fashion. They 
have not been suited to handling reciprocal processes and complex 
configurations. Researchers have not looked at phenomena as patterns 
and systems as they have not had the appropriate tools to explain 
them. With this in mind, this chapter set out to present an overview 
of different methods that can be undertaken when dealing with 
different types of phenomena. There is a need for a sensitivity in 
choice of method when dealing with different types of problems. An 
example is the limited linguistic repertoire of a child, which is seen in 
theory of mind research. An approach like the microgenetic method 
could be considered in this case, as it is not overly reliant on 
children's verbal responses. 
The need for creativity in research has resulted in this work treating 
logical positivism as a whipping boy (Piaget, 1980). This would 
necessitate a break with the old hypothetico-deductive approach, a 
legacy of the logical positivist paradigm. The focus would shift from 
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being overly concerned with superficial observational levels to real 
life problems. It would expand the notion of psychology as a science 
from one where researchers are concerned with testing and 
verification of hypotheses to one where they are actively engaged in 
solving problems and generating theories as it attempts to explain 
underlying causes of phenomena. 
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Conclusion 
Chandler and Chapman ( 1991) describe the common way of ending a 
piece of work, where central themes running through the various 
chapters are highlighted. The purpose of this is to hopefully draw 
some conclusions regarding the current state of knowledge about the 
specific topic. Like Chandler and Chapman, I believe that the decades 
of debate over psychology's current view of science and the resulting 
methodologies have failed to reach consensus, as well as the routes by 
which agreement might be reached. 
This work has shown how current methodologies used with children 
in developmental psychology maintain an adherence to the logical 
positivist tradition. Hooker ( 198 7) states that the methods that are 
accepted in research are a function of which theories are accepted. 
Thus, breaking with the logical positivist paradigm with its method of 
hypothesis testing and embracing another view of science, entails that 
there will be fresh approaches made in the field of methodology. The 
challenges that a change in scientific method would bring seem to 
discourage researchers from abandoning their logical positivist roots. 
The goal of this work has been to retrace the historical context of the 
current impasse in developmental research in the hope of finding a 
way around it. The ideas of Piaget and Vygotsky have been explored 
in the hope of questioning old solutions and drawing out potentially 
positive implications from their ideas. Much of Piaget's work has 
tended to be dismissed, with new students being urged to discount his 
outdated views. This tendency to discount ideas from the past is 
shortsighted and ill-informed, for such ideas might help inform a new 
critical view of science. The controversies surrounding Piaget's 
theories still have to be clarified conceptually, before they can be 
settled empirically or methodologically. Haig (1995) has pointed out 
that a major problem in current research is the tendency of 
researchers to test theories prematurely. A central feature of much of 
the research being done with children is the role of the scientist in 
fixing the meanings of explanatory concepts. Clarification of 
competence as an explanatory concept is needed before claims about 
its manifestation can be made. Before one can detect a particular 
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competence, one must have some conception of what one wishes to 
detect. Chapman and Chandler ( 1991) claim that instead of measuring 
the same competence with different assessment procedures, 
researchers often measure competencies which are conceptually 
distinct from each other. Researchers need to move beyond the 
question of the true age at which a competence first develops to what 
exactly it is that develops at different ages. Thus we need 
unambiguous criteria for distinguishing between different 
competencies that may be manifest in a single task. 
By contrast, many of Vygotsky's ideas are being enthusiastically 
received, but they tend to ignore the context in which they were 
worked out. His zone of proximal development is one area which 
seems to be getting a lot of attention. However it was not meant as a 
place or a setting in which to situate research as most seem to regard 
it. Vygotsky held the view that science is a critical activity that has 
the potential to liberate people. Many of those attracted to his 
conception of zone would find this transformational notion of science 
unacceptable and possibly quaint. 
The fact that science might be regarded as a cultural invention is one 
that deserves attention. Hooker (1987) claims that science can be seen 
as an adaptive mechanism for coping with survival, a modern day 
person's equivalent of the caveman's tool. Science, indeed, may be 
relative to given cultures. Bruner (1991) describes how the current 
cognitive revolution in psychology has replaced the concepts of 
meaning and construction with information and processing notions. He 
claims that psychology has been technicalized and trivialized. 
At the present day the discipline of psychology could be described as 
a largely white, middle class endeavour. Some (Gergen, 1973; 
Sampson, 1977) claim that psychology has been constructed to reflect 
the ethnic and class values of psychologists themselves. If psychology 
and indeed developmental psychology is to endure, it needs to recruit 
students of diversity to represent perspectives of diverse populations. 
Meacham ( 1996) claims that the quality of training programmes, the 
conduct of science and the contribution of research to society will be 
enhanced if psychology includes more students with varying life 
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experiences. Developmental theory likewise needs to be transformed 
to emphasize the various historical, social and cultural contexts in 
which development takes place. 
One theme that emerged in Chapter One was how, despite the 
inadequacies of the logical positivist approach to psychology, its 
methodolgies are still currently practised. Despite its lack of concern 
for the situatedness of human beings in a socio-historical context, and 
its failure to accommodate this in its laboratory paradigm, it is still the 
dominant methodology of the day. Scientific realism was offered as a 
solution to a breaking from the old paradigm. Yet its methodologies 
are in their infancy. Such methodologies would not be heavily based 
on hypothesis testing and verification as there is a need for methods 
that go beyond that particular part of the research process. Hooker 
makes the point that there will always be uncertainty about scientific 
method as it is always chosen and implemented in a specific historical 
context. 
A related issue was raised in Chapter Two where the role of children 
in research was discussed. The notions of childhood and development 
were seen to be influenced by a logical positivist orientation. The child 
was valued for what it could bring to the laboratory, and the context 
in which its competencies were acquired and displayed were either 
ignored or simply treated as variables. The true nature of 
development has not been dealt with by psychological researchers 
who have been hamstrung by a commitment to positivist 
methodologies where the focus has been on change as a static entity 
that is addressed to different ages. This latter commitment has led 
researchers to focus on age related changes; once again the focus has 
been on the change as an event. This has resulted in current research 
finding ever earlier ages at which competencies are found. Theory of 
mind research is an example of this, with a flurry of tests being 
devised to test whether a child accomplishes a false belief test 
successfully at a particular age. The first sighting of a competence is 
taken as the successful formation of a competence and it is treated as 
an emergent construct. It is suggested that this should be 
accommodated into a truly developmental perspective, with the first 
evidence being seen as a small step in the establishment of a 
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competence, rather than being treated as a full blown competence. 
This would encourage a genuine developmental attitude in 
developmental psychology with the tracing of competencies' 
generalisation and maturation over a period of time. Once again, 
researchers would do well to take note of Piaget's approach to human 
development, which was genuinely developmental, with his view of 
progressive transformation, differentiation and integration. He saw a 
fundamental continuity between biological and psychological 
integration as well as within psychological functioning itself. This 
lends itself to an approach that shifts the focus away from an 
emphasis on product, towards one where the focus is a process 
orientation. This is a developmental notion, which up until recently 
has viewed development as a series of static changes. 
The current focus in theory of mind research has likewise treated 
mental representations as static entities within the mind. There has 
been a concern with the products of concept formation and not their 
developmental course. Cognitive structures have been regarded as 
products of the developmental process. This desire for objectivism in 
methodology has been a result of the positivist inclination to focus on 
knowledge as part of an objective reality that we can come to know. 
The connection between knowledge and interest has been ignored or 
avoided. According to Habermas ( 1971) this view of knowledge as an 
objective entity must be discarded, so that the connection between 
knowledge and interest might be acknowledged. Knowing then 
becomes more important than knowledge. Scientific realism's notion of 
humans coming to know the world as they quest for it, and 
evolutionary naturalist realism's view that humans come to know the 
world as they interact with it, lend themselves to this process 
orientation. 
A scientific realist view is able to accommodate the study of 
generative mechanisms that cause change. Thus the focus is on the 
structures behind the change and not the change events themselves. 
Piaget affirmed the existence of such structures, describing them as 
'causally active' (Piaget, 1941, p.217). Theory of mind research, 
however, looks to the successful performance of the child to convey 
the presence of a competence. A related issue is whether a 
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competence should be regarded as an attribute of the individual alone 
or as a relational characteristic within a particular social and ecological 
context. The traditional assumption has been that competence resides 
within the individual. An alternative view is offered by Vygotsky in 
the 1920s and Meacham (1991) where competence is regarded not as 
a property of the individual child, but as a complex that includes the 
child as well as the social supports available to them. Hooker (1987) 
likewise believes that many of our competencies might be species 
capacities rather than individual capacities. This would shift the 
research focus away from the individual towards the interrelations 
among people. This point has implications for methodologies as well as 
incorporating a perspective which allows for the explicit consideration 
of social, cultural and economic factors. 
The motivation behind asessments with children is called into 
question by Meacham (1991). He sees assessments with children as 
primarily being motivated by the need to intervene and control. He 
likens the treatment of children to nature, two forces over which 
humans freely exert control. Hooker's (1989) evolutionary naturalist 
realism is a view of science that counters this attitude with its anti-
anthropomorphic view of humans. His theory of science sites humans 
in their evolutionary context rather than in a position of privilege. In 
considering the global context in which they function, humans would 
see themselves as a part of nature and not apart from it. 
While some researchers are slowly acknowledging the family as an 
appropriate context in which to investigate children, the traditional 
family is ironically becoming more and more of an anachronism 
(Kessen, 1993). The structure of many families at the end of the 
twenty-first century is changing all the time. The modern family with 
its many varieties is a difficult context to research, and one for which 
traditional methods are not particularly suited. A scientific realist 
approach would be able to facilitate the task of investigating these 
changing realities of the family context by approaching them 
abductively as a problem-solving endeavour. It is crucial that these 
realities not be placed in the 'too hard' basket and that they be 
regarded as worth investigating. It is a major challenge for science to 
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provide researchers with methodologies that will assist them in their 
complex tasks of investigating children in their operating contexts. 
Chapter Three investigates the different methodologies that could be 
used with different age groups. The abductive approach to scientific 
method (Haig, 199 5) can accommodate these methods, by offering 
guidance on problem-based inquiry. The microgenetic method seems 
to be one of the few truly developmental methods. It focusses on 
change as it occurs and seeks the conditions and occurrences just 
before, during and immediately after a change is noted. It is aimed at 
accounting for the mechanisms that generate these changes. Whilst 
there are few microgenetic studies being conducted, it is to be hoped 
that the quality of data, research practices and conclusions that they 
produce will encourage researchers to use it more widely. The 
conduct of research in institutions will need to make better provision 
for research which takes more time, uses more team work and 
produces more useful and better quality results. For example, Piaget 
( 19 2 9) recommended that clinicians working with children be trained 
for at least a year in order to become proficient in talking to children 
in clinical settings. Most research that is presently undertaken with 
children sees talking with children as requiring no special skills or 
understanding. Acknowledging that this is an area requiring 
specialized skills would prolong the time and effort needed for 
research in this area. The current ethos argues against this type of 
research; however, such a change in attitude would surely help bring 
about the needed improvement in the quality of developmental 
research. 
Psycholgy's desire to be accepted as a hard science and to be included 
in Comte's hierarchy of scientific knowledge along with social physics, 
physiology, chemistry, physics and astronomy, has led to it adopting a 
course that has both determined and restricted its theoretical and 
practical research. This has likewise led to its desire to be treated as a 
separate endeavour from philosophy, thus rejecting its metaphysical 
origins. In its desire to win credibility and status along with the hard 
sciences, it adopted a view of science which has had a logical positivist 
orientation. The validity of observational facts and statements 
assumed primary importance. Subjective experience belonged to the 
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realm of philosophy, which was deemed unscientific. Experimental 
psychology grew out of this milieu with its view of people as being 
passive objects whose behaviour could be explained under closed 
systems in the laboratory. Anything that affected this procedure was 
deemed to be a nuisance variable. This has led to the reductionist 
approach which was based on the epistemological stance of breaking 
down complex phenomena. Salomon ( 1996) describes how each 
psychological phenomenon or state of mind is conceptualized and 
studied as an entity unto itself. The decontextualized individual has 
been the object of much American psychological research this century. 
When the individual enters the laboratory they leave behind most of 
what makes them who they are. The cognitive revolution has 
reinforced this trend with its focus on ever smaller intra-individual 
and mainly context-free units of analysis (Prilleltensky, 1989). This 
self-contained individualism is not a fundamental psychological 
principle, but a cultural and historical thesis. Alternative 
conceptualizations are possible and necessary if psychology is to make 
a contribution to resolving contemporary social issues ( Sampson, 
1977). 
Instead of viewing itself as being in a privileged position as both a 
natural and social science, psychology has sought to restrict research 
according to the view which sees knowledge as part of an invariant 
order, which we can come to know if we have suitable measurement 
tools. This has stifled research theoretically and practically, with the 
products of such research having little connection with the reality 
outside the laboratory. Psychology has chosen to restrict itself to 
superficial observational levels and has left itself little credibility in 
the changing face of the reality outside the laboratory window. I have 
argued that it has to confront real problems and real people within 
the historical, social and cultural contexts in which they operate, 
before it can hope to assume credibility. Although psychology is in a 
privileged position of being in part a natural and in part a social 
science, this has not liberated it beyond the realms of observational 
knowledge. 
Psychology has to abandon the logical positivist influence and its focus 
on the decontextualized individual and seek to embrace a wider 
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notion of science which will not restrict its theoretical and practical 
development. In the 1920s and 1930s Vygotsky argued for multiple 
forces of development each with their own set of explanatory 
principles. Human behaviour does not occur within closed systems and 
so researchers have to accept that there will be no exceptionless 
empirical regularities to discover. Assessment of theories will have to 
be explanatory and not predictive. We do not acquire knowledge of 
the world simply through hypothesis testing and induction, but 
through a cooperative enterprise of related persons (Gergen, 1985). 
Many years ago, Vygotsky pointed this out in his argument that 
psychological functions occur first on the social plane and are only 
then taken onto the individual plane. Theory of mind research would 
do well to research children interacting with their caregivers, for 
context reflects the reality of the child's thoughts far more accurately 
than a laboratory with a stranger who offers hypothetical situations. 
We need an integration of theory development with an improvement 
in practical research. This will only occur when the unit of analysis 
seeks to reflect and not reduce the complexity of the phenomena. 
McGuire ( 197 3) believes that once humans are studied as real-life 
composites, theoretical and practically oriented questions will merge. 
Vygotsky urged for the study of the historical child, emphasizing the 
importance of the historical, social and cultural context. Context, 
however, is not something that can be separated from a person; it 
reciprocally affects humans' thoughts and actions. Likewise the 
competencies and skills that humans are assumed to be endowed with 
are situated in immediate contexts of practice. This makes a mockery 
of research that attempts to discover skills and competencies which 
reside within the individual and ignores context. Individuals and their 
mental states cannot be studied in isolation nor out of their social and 
cultural context. Credibility will return to psychology as it directs its 
attempts at a multiplicity of problems that are occurring within the 
larger world. This will allow psychology to have both a critical and a 
transformational role to play in the twenty-first century. 
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